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"Good science advice is essential to wise decision-making." 
-- John Kerry 
Abstract: In 2001, President George W. Bush remarked, "Science and technology havc 
never been more essential to the defense of the nation and the health of the econ~my."' 
The responsibility for formulating science and technology policy primarily falls into the 
hands of Congress. However, since few members of Congress possess a broad base of 
knowledge in either science or technology, they must rely on external sources of 
information. I examine the sources of information on which they rely, or the question 
"Who has the Congressional Ear?"with regard to science and technology issues. Using 
the downfall of the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) in 1995 as a point of 
punctuated equilibrium, according to Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones' theoretical 
framework for ~olitical change. I examine the issues of NASA authorizations. hazardous 
- ,  
waste (superfund), and global warming, before and after OTA, looking at the sources of 
information in congressional hearings on these particular issues. I found that the degree 
of politicization vaed ,  depending on the issuein question. The politicization was - 
greatest in the issue of global warming. Overall, there was a decrease in the number of 
witnesses per issue and an increase in the number of witnesses with a Republican 
affiliation. 
' Remarks by President George W. Bush in Meeting with High-Tech Leaders. March 28,2001. Available 
at htto://www.whitehouse.ogv/news/releases/2001/03/20010328-2h~. Taken from National Academy of 
Sciences, "Rising Above the Gathering Stom", Prepublication copy February 2006, p. ES-12. 
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CHAPTER I: INTRODUCTION 
Who has the congressional ear? The answer to this question has profound 
implications public policy, particularly given the complexity and pervasive applications 
of scientific and technological discoveries. In 1998, F. James Sensenbrenner, Jr., the 
chairman of the House Committee on Science, noted: 
"Science and engineering provide more than the ideas for future products 
or the foundation for advances in manufacturing. They also provide the 
basis for making decisions as a society, as corporations and as 
individuals.. . For example, we turn to scientists and engineers for answers 
to questions such as "To what standards should cities' building codes be 
written?" Engineers, seismologists, geologists and materials scientists may 
all need to be consulted. Or, "Is the food on the dinner table safe to eat?" 
"Is a new drug ready for use by humans?" Epidemiologists, 
microbiologists and pharmacologists, among many others, must inform us 
(Sensenbrenner, 1998,47)." 
Global warming, nuclear weapons, anti-terrorism mechanisms, nano-technology, 
space exploration, and superconductivity are only a few of the many issues which 
demand scientific expertise. Congress also must make decisions related to 
medicine and health care, electronics, energy, and technology funding. The 2006 
National Academies of Science (NAS) report "Rising Above the Gathering 
Storm" (RAGS) reminds us that the products of science and technology have 
made notable improvements in our daily lives over the past century: vaccines and 
drugs, which now prevent the outbreaks of smallpox, tuberculosis, typhoid, or 
cholera, lifesaving medical instrumentation, electronic communications devices, 
and work-saving conveniences in our homes, including electricity, sanitation, and 
transportation (NAS, 2006, 2: 1) . Further, RAGS points out that the "largest 
economic influence is in the productivity gains that follow the adoption of new 
products and technologies (NAS, 2006,2: 
If science and technology (S&T) play such an important role in the health 
and wellbeing of our nation, then Congress must base its policies on sound 
scientific advice. The House Committee on Science (formerly the Science, Space 
and Technology Committee) is primarily responsible for deliberating over most 
science issues. The Committee's official jurisdiction gives it responsibility "over 
all non-defense federal scientific research and development (R&D)" and charges 
it to ensure "that Federal tax dollars are being spent wisely and efficiently and that 
America's Federal science and technology enterprise maintains its world 
preeminence." Additionally, the Committee is responsible for proposing ways in 
which research and development can solve some of our nation's most pressing 
problems.4 
Dr. Albert Teich of the American Association for the Advancement of Science 
(AAAS) noted (Teich, 2006, I), "Few Members of Congress, with the notable exception 
of several members of this [House Science] committee, and relatively few congressional 
staff, have backgrounds in science." While Congress must make many decisions with 
regard to science and technology, most Congress members do not possess a broad base of 
knowledge in these subject areas. As a result, they have to depend on outside sources of 
D.J. Wilson. Is embodied technology change the result of upstream R&D? Industry-level evidence 
Review of Economic Dynamics 5(2)(2002):342-362. 
Taken from the House Committee on Science website. Official Jurisdiction of the Committee. Last 
accessed 16 December 2006, httD:llwww.house.eov/scienceicommitteeinfomembe/inde.h. 
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scientific information. The House Committee on Science Report, "Unlocking our Future: 
Toward a New National Science Policy" notes, 
"While every individual must exercise his or her own judgment in making 
decisions -and be willing to accept responsibility for doing s e w e  
nevertheless must of necessity rely on decisions made by our elected 
officials, regulators, and the courts for decisions that affect our society. 
When the decisions to be made involve technical issues, decision-makers 
must have access to and, to a large extent rely on, the advice and counsel 
of the scientific and engineering community (Sensenbrenner, 1998,47)." 
Science committee chair F. James Sensenbrenner (Sensenbrenner, 1998,48) notes, "To 
further complicate matters, in many cases science simply does not have all of the 
answers" and sometimes "different scientists may derive very different inferences &om 
the available data." Thus, scientific advice becomes complicated because, 
"Those on both sides of the issue level charges that the other side is doing 
"bad" science. Each side produces its own contingent of scientists who in 
turn put forth conflicting interpretations of the available data, if they even 
agree on that. Accusations are made that the other side's scientists "have 
an agenda" or are beholden to a particular stakeholder in the issue 
(Sensenbrenner, 1998,48)." 
The notion of "bad science" recently has become contentious across partisan 
lines, with the 1994 Republican takeover of majority in Congress and the subsequent 
changes to the congressional scientific advisory process. Chris Mooney, author o f m  
Republican War on Science, states that the current Republican approach to science is 
only slightly less tainted than that of Stalinist ~ ~ s e n k o i s m ~  (Mooney, 2005, 12). He 
argues that under Republican leadership, science and scientific fact have become 
increasingly used as weapons of Congress to support or validate political agendas. 
Lysenkoism was a campaign against genetics and geneticists which happened in the Soviet Union from 
the middle of the 1930s to the middle of the 1960s, centered on the figure of TrofirnDenisovich Lysenko. 
Lysenkoism is oftcn invoked to imply the overt subversion of science by political forces. 
Mooney contends, ''In recent years, the Republicans as a party have been alienating 
intellectuals deliberately, as a matter of taste and strategy (2005, 165)." He argues that 
current "abuses push the issue of science politicization to the point of crisis" (2005,242) 
in which the impacts of politicized science start to have real implications for society. 
Sensenbrenner highlights environmental concerns as one particular example of the 
implications of science policy stating, "Properly managing our natural resources, 
ensuring clean air and clean water for every citizen, and preserving the planet for future 
generations are concerns shared by every American. The decisions that must be made in 
order to tackle these issues, however, are at times highly contentious (Mooney, 2006, 
Professor Jon Peha from Carnegie Mellon University (Peha, 2006) noted, "With 
this kind of issue, Congress needs balanced analysis that identifies possible policy 
options, and pros and cons of each, without telling Congress what to do. Armed with this 
basic knowledge, Members of Congress can listen to stakeholders, and make their own 
decisions about which policy is best overall. But who can provide this background?" Dr. 
Peter Blair, of the National Research Committee remarks similarly, pointing out that 
"James Madison or Thomas Jefferson might well have argued that a 
government poorly informed about science and technology issues, because 
such issues are often so complex and have such impact on society, is 
destined to make bad policy choices. Yet, today, it is becoming 
increasingly more difficult for anyone, or even any institution, to keep 
pace with the frontier of knowledge. How, then, can the Congress receive 
usefbl, relevant, informed, independent, authoritative and timely advice on 
the science and technology dimensions of the issues it faces?" (2006, 1) 
Until the Republicans won a House majority in the 1994 congressional elections, 
one answer to Peha's question was the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA). 
The OTA was created in 1972 to provide an unbiased source of scientific 
information for Congress. While the OTA was largely successful in that endeavor, it was 
eliminated in 1994, in what Bruce Bimber (1996, 69) calls a partisan assertion of 
authority. When the OTA fell, Congress lost its primary source of non-partisan 
information. According to Mooney (2006,48) "getting rid of an impartial scientific 
source like OTA greatly facilitated the politicization of science." Dr. Peter Blair of the 
National Research Council elaborates on the effects of the loss of the OTA: 
"With the closure of the former Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), 
the latter type of analysis [elaborate on the broader context of an issue and 
inform the policy debate with careful and objective analysis of the policy 
consequences of alternative courses of action, especially those that may 
involve value judgments and trade-offs beyond the scope of technical 
analysis] as performed by a disinterested analytical organization is no 
longer readily accessible to the Congress and may need to be 
reconstructed in some way (Blair, 2006,4)." 
Yet neither the Republican attack on science, nor the claim that the fall of the 
OTA has removed objectivity from congressional deliberation on science has been 
subjected to a systematic analysis. Bruce Bimber's study of the OTA demise does not 
compare the sources of information during the existence of the OTA and after the fall of 
the OTA. Meanwhile Mooney relies on selective examples rather than systematic 
analysis to support his argument. This study fills the gap between the Mooney and 
Bimber studies by analyzing the sources of information to the House Committee on 
Science before and after the fall of the OTA. This study addresses three questions. First, 
did the GOP takeover of the House and the subsequent demise of the OTA increase the 
degree of unscientific or politically biased sources of information provided to Congress? 
Second, did Congress lose the type of objective and unbiased information provided by the 
OTA, or did some other institution serve the function previously performed by OTA? 
Third, did the sources of scientific information take on a distinctly Republican bent after 
the decline of OTA? In order to address these questions, I begin with a brief description 
of the OTA's history and purpose. Then I develop specific hypotheses based on a theory 
of punctuated equilibrium derived fiom Baumgartner and Jones (1 993) study of agenda 
change. 
The Rise and Fall of the OTA 
The Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) was created by the Technology 
Assessment Act of 1972 for the express purpose "to improve foresight about the 
consequences of policy decisions involving scientific or technological questions (Birnber, 
1996,26)." It was one of four institutions with the responsibility of giving Congress 
impartial and unbiased advice on science and technology. The others are the Government 
Accountability Office (formerly the General Accounting Office) (GAO), the Ofice of 
Budget Management (OBM), and the Congressional Research Service (CRS). These four 
agencies collectively became the manifestation of the idea of "experts who were on tap, 
not on top (Bimber, 1996,28)." In other words, these agencies comprised a group of 
experts who were "on-call" to Congress at any time. 
The OTA and other scientific advisory agencies attempted to bridge the natural 
divide between policy-makers and scientists. John Gibbons, former director of the Office 
of Technology Assessment (OTA) and former Science Advisor to President Clinton, 
observes (Golden, 1995,415) that "practitioners of science and technology on the one 
hand, and law on the other remain largely ignorant of the other's mysteries-the 
scientist's reaction to the intricacies of policy-making parallels the politician's aversion 
to the laboratories, to the uncertainties inherent in research and, sometimes, to the 
constraints on decision-making that are the outcome of analysis." Dr. Alan Mazur, 
professor of Public Affairs at Syracuse University argues (Mazur, 1981,82) that even 
"The political judgments of scientists are shaped by their social milieus, just as are those 
of laymen, and in this value-laden domain, the scientist has no greater claim to wisdom or 
objectivity than anyone else." The OTA was designed to overcome these divides, by 
providing an unbiased source of scientific information. Dr. Peter Blair points out that 
"Indeed, OTA was prohibited in its enabling legislation from making 
recommendations, so the panel was created to try to collect the views of 
all important stakeho1der;rather than to try to consensus 
recommendations (although consensus findings and conclusions were 
provided and viewed as important by requesting Congressional 
committees). Instead, the OTA project teams sought to analyze and 
articulate the consequences of alternative courses of action and elaborate 
on the context of a problem without coming to consensus 
recommendations on a specific course of action, which would be difficult 
anyway with a diverse group with points of view that prevented consensus 
on many controversial issues (2006, I)." 
Congress needs sources of scientific information of this kind, consisting of neutral 
experts (Bimber, 1996, 16) who are "more concerned with the substance of policy 
problems than with the impact of policy choices." Dr. Jeffrey Stine, the curator of 
Engineering and Environmental History at the National Museum of American History, 
crystallizes this argument: "To fulfill its funding and oversight roles properly, Congress 
must have its own bipartisan science and technology advisory apparatus, free of agency 
or disciplinary bias" (Golden, 1995,446). The OTA filled this role for Congress during 
its time of existence. 
The OTA was a small organization which maintained a simple command structure 
composed of two levels: analysts and the heads of the agency (Bimber, 1996,30), 
roughly 75 percent of whom were researchers by profession (Bimber, 1996,31). While 
the majority of the staff had research backgrounds, OTA officials did not conduct any 
assessment themselves; analysts merely acted as brokers for information generated by 
scientists working outside of the government (Bimber, 1996,28). The agency was 
overseen by a board of directors known as the Technology Assessment Board (TAB) 
which was designed to be completely non-partisan. The TAB board of directors 
determined which studies the OTA would complete, reviewed the studies which were 
performed by the OTA, and maneuvered between the congressional committees in order 
to serve all parties equally and foster a personal clientele. OTA's information was most 
successfully utilized when it could be passed directly to members of Congress and 
staffers, through means of a person-to-person connection. Bimber (1996, 35) says "This 
tension, between the need for personal familiarity and for institutional neutrality and 
credibility was one of the most defining features of OTA as an organization." Further, 
only congressional committee chairs could request the creation of an OTA report, which 
significantly limited the size of the OTA ~lientele.~ 
Although the OTA was praised for its neutrality, the process of achieving 
neutrality was certainly not a pre-condition of the agency. Rather, the OTA was unique 
in that, contrary to most agencies which begin with a neutral basis and progress to higher 
degrees of politicization in order to survive, it actually began with a high degree of 
politicization and gradually became more neutral (Bimber, 1996, 21). In its early years, 
under "Rule Number 12", which gave the control of the agency staff appointments 
While the combination of these two factors, focused clientele and personal cornmumcation with Congress, 
led to praise for the OTA's effectiveness and efficiency, (Bimber, 1996, p.31) it was also one of the reasons 
for its downfall in 1995. 
10 
entirely over to board members, OTA found itself suffering from political appointments 
and strong politicization (Bimber, 1996, 54). The "key to OTA's changed stature was its 
need to build and maintain for itself an internal clientele" (Bimber, 1996, 51), which was 
originally attempted through partisan favoritism under Director Daddario, and then 
successfully achieved through balanced neutrality under Peterson and Gibbons. Indeed 
Bimber classifies the cornerstone of OTA's success as its "ability to separate institutional 
loyalty from partisanship loyalty" (Bimber, 1996,49). Further, he states that Gibbon's 
reforms and "Fourth of July Massacre," (Bimber, 1996, 57) in which Gibbons fired 15% 
of his staff and began a strategy of neutrality saved the agency from extinction in the 
1980's. Neutrality became one of OTA's defining features, as well as a defining 
characteristic for the other scientific advisors to Congress. The OTA found that the 
strategy of not making policy recommendations and instead offering "something for 
everyone" generated the least conflict and criticism (Bimber, 1996,64). These 
characteristics were the OTA's strength, causing it to become a model for a neutral 
scientific advisory agency, duplicated around the world, notably in Germany, the UK, 
France, and the Netherlands (Bimber, 1996,47). 
The OTA's operations, and productivity were smaller than the other government 
research agencies, and its impact on policy makers was hard to quantify. In terms of 
productivity, the OTA annually published an average of 20 to 30 studies per year, at a 
cost of approximately $1 million per study (Bimber, 1996,33). By comparison, the CRS 
receives nearly % million requests for studies per year (Bimber, 1996, 80); meanwhile the 
budget of the GAO is five times that of the CBO and the CRS combined (Bimber, 1996, 
88). The GAO publishes approximately 2,000 studies each year7. Further, Bimber states 
that one cannot cite a single bill in which OTA clearly decided the outcome (1996,36). 
Rather, OTA's influence was primarily rhetorical and analytical. Furthermore (Bimber, 
1996, 36), "OTA's work played a role more consistent with rational models of politics in 
which the utility of information derives from its capacity to reduce uncertainty." Bimber 
states that to see the real effects of the agency, one has to look back to when policy 
proposals were formulated, because (1996,39) "once positions are determined, it's too 
late [for the experts to matter]." The OTA did not instruct the legislators how to vote, but 
rather that it helped them establish a basis for their positions (Bimber, 1996,46). 
Bimber then poses the question, if the OTA was so effective, why was it cut as a 
part of the congressional downsizing agenda of the 1994 elections? Observers offer two 
answers to this question: one institutional, the other political. First, the customary GOP 
answer is that the OTA was expendable; it was small, performed a specialized function, 
and would have few short term consequences if it was cut. Representative George E. 
Brown, Jr. reflected this view: he said, "OTA was a small, easily targeted agency whose 
elimination would have an adverse affect on Congress' long-term well-being, but would 
not have any direct, short term consequences for legislators' interest (Bimber, 1996, 72)." 
The monetary effect of cutting the OTA was minuscule; the federal government saved 
approximately $20 million dollars in culting OTA (Bimber, 1996,71). While it 
performed a unique service, Bimber concluded (77), "funding for OTA was abolished not 
because it was so large, but because it was so tiny." Further, while few members of 
Congress disputed the comprehensiveness of the OTA reports, many were dissatisfied 
with the length of time that it took for the OTA to produce a single report, arguing that it 
was ineffective because of the timeframe on which it operated. 
The second answer is that the OTA was cut because the new Republican majority 
had its own scientific agenda, and the OTA did not fit that agenda. Mooney (2005,54) 
compares the OTA to Socrates, saying "He gave advice to other people. He was 
poisoned." While Newt Gingrich Republicans promoted the abolition of the OTA as a 
'free market' concept, Mooney points out that it resulted in a 'fiee market' of science 
expertise, where authority went to the highest bidder or the greatest power (2005, 50). 
Thus, Representative Brown likewise recognized the political cause of the OTA's 
demise: "Let me conclude with an observation made by a former OTA employee who 
stated OTA's task as being to create for Congress a 'defense against the dumb.' It is 
shameful that OTA was defenseless against a very dumb decision by Congress. In the 
end, OTA proved to be too smart for a new Congress that is in love with simple answers 
(1995, I)." While OTA did have powerful friends in Congress, who prevented its demise 
briefly through controversial amendments, ultimately, they were not able to prevent its 
downfall. 
The OTA fulfilled an important role in the scientific policy-making process. Not 
only was held in high regard by the majority of the legislative community for the quality 
of work that it put forth, but it provided a type of information and analysis which Dr. 
Blair asserts is no longer readily available to Congress. As Dr. Blair (2006,4) noted, 
without the OTA, there is a gap in the type of information and analysis that Congress 
receives: "With the closure of the former Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), the 
latter type of analysis . . . is no longer readily accessible to the Congress." Now, without 
the presence of the OTA, presumably Congress members depend more heavily on their 
own scientific experts, who most likely possess a stake in the policy outcome. Blair's 
statement leads us nicely into the overarching question of this study: To what extent did 
the demise of the OTA change the information that Congress receives? 
Punctuated Equilibrium 
How can the disappearance of a research organization that serves Congress alter 
the sources of information received by it congressional committees? In Agendas and 
Instability in American Politics, Frank Baumgartner and Bryan Jones propose a theory of 
punctuated equilibrium in political dynamics, much like that of Nils Eldridge and Steven 
J. Gould (Eldridge, 1972) in evolutionary biology. In essence, their argument is that 
agenda change happens suddenly even in the most stable institutions. Stability is defined 
by a state of equilibrium in a subsystem institution, such as a congressional committee, in 
which "essential features would not change significantly" (Baumgartner and Jones, 1996, 
13). A state of equilibrium can be disrupted, or punctuated, by political or institutional 
forces, and ultimately a new state of equilibrium will emerge over time. Change occurs 
in select "windows of opportunity," in which all the necessary preconditions align. 
These windows of opportunity are produced with issue redefinition and institutional 
change. Issue redefinition can occur when popular opinion shifts, or when a powerful 
enough institutional agenda re-aligns. Likewise, institutional change can be structural, or 
political. 
The theory of punctuated equilibrium suggests that the sources of information 
utilized by Congress should shift, after the demise of the OTA. Though he did not use 
the terminology defined by Baumgartner and Jones, Mooney essentially argues that the 
GOP takeover of the House and the demise of the OTA constitute a point of punctuated 
equilibrium with respect to science policy. Presumably, a less politicized and stable 
system of science policy formation was dismantled and replaced by a more politicized 
system with a Republican bias. Mooney suggests that, in the absence of the OTA, 
Republicans began relying more heavily on their own scientists for information, fostering 
both the idea that "truth is more likely to be found at the fringes of science than at the 
center" (2005,55) and that one could "pick up the phone and call your bud" (2005,249) 
for scientific information. If such an abrupt and pervasive shock took effect in 1995, then 
the House Committee on Science, the predominant subsystem of science policy making 
in Congress, would receive information from very different sources. Moreover, since 
Mooney claims that the Republican war on science stretches across various types of 
issues, from chemicals in the water to greenhouse gases in the atmosphere, presumably 
the change would not discriminate by issue. Bimber predicts a similar result, suggesting 
that the absence of a decentralized, expert advice agency leads to an eventual reliance on 
Congress members' own favored scientists, consequently yielding greater politicization 
of scientific information (1996, 99). 
In order to test these claims, therefore, we must consider the sources of 
information given to the House Committee on Science across a range of issues before and 
after the fall of the OTA. This study selects three areas of science policy (NASA 
authorization, superfund, and global warming) for reasons that are described in the 
following chapter. For now, let it suffice to clarify three hypotheses which I test by 
analyzing patterns in witness appearances in testimonies for hearings of the House 
Committee on Science for each of these three issues. 
The first hypothesis, i.e. the "politicization hypothesis," is that more witnesses 
that represent organizations with a bias testify to the House Committee on Science after 
.the decline of the OTA. Politicization, as it relates to science, generally occurs when 
industry groups, interest groups, or partisan government officials lay specific pressure on 
Congress in favor of a particular policy or policy action. We can measure politicization 
quantitatively in this study by comparing the presence of different witness types, before 
and after 1995. An increase in the number of interest group witnesses and industry 
witnesses would suggest an increased level of politicization. The second hypothesis, the 
"substitute hypothesis," predicts that the objective information provided by OTA is not 
substituted for by some other government research organization, like OTA. A 
politicized Congress that just eliminated OTA presumably would have no interest in 
replacing its advice with information from a similar institution. The third hypothesis, "the 
party hypothesis," predicts that witnesses testifying after the OTA's demise have a 
Republican bias. Thus, not only are witnesses more biased, but they present information 
favorable to Republican viewpoints on all issues. It is possible that the results of all three 
of these hypotheses could depend on the issues in question and the degree of partisan 
divide inherent within the issue itself. In other words, issues are privy to partisan divide 
are more likely to see increased politicization after the fall of the OTA. For this reason, 
the issues which I select are particularly beneficial, because they fall along a continuum 
of inherent political divide, which is clarified in chapter two. 
A fair test of each hypothesis requires a clearly defined methodology for selecting 
cases, defining concepts, and variables and gathering data, steps that are take in Chapter 
two. In Chapter three, I test all three hypotheses for all three issues. The final chapter 
draws several conclusions fiom the analysis. The ultimate aim of the thesis, again, is to 
 evaluate the claim that the demise of OTA fundamentally altered sources of scientific 
information in Congress. Thus, the issue of politicization is really at the heart of this 
study, and the stakes are high. John Gibbons, the former director of the OTA and the 
Science Advisor to former President Clinton stated, "Healthy skepticism is an essential 
and treasured feature of scientific analysis, but the willful distortion of evidence has no 
place at the table of scientific enquiry" (Mooney, 2005,59). Inaccurate or politicized 
science often leads to misinformed or ill-advised decisions. Chris Mooney (2005, 11) 
echoes this sentiment: "Science politicization threatens not just our public health and the 
environment, but the very integrity of American democracy, which relies heavily on 
scientific and technical expertise to function." 
CHAPTER 11: OTA AND CONGRESSIONAL COMMITTEES 
This chapter lays the essential groundwork for a close analysis of politicization on 
the House Committee on Science after the demise of the OTA. I begin with a 
comprehensive review of the OTA's input into congressional committee deliberations, 
including witness testimony from OTA officials and OTA reports. The data illustrate 
OTA's broad presence on Capitol Hill from its origins in 1972 to its demise in 1995. 
The OTA studied so many different issues and testified before so many different 
committees that a comprehensive analysis of the OTA's input into congressional 
deliberations is virtually impossible. Thus, my study focuses on a few issues handled by 
one major committee. The House Committee on Science is the primary deliberative 
body to receive OTA's expertise, though the frequency of OTA's advice to the committee 
varied by policy issue. After applying several criteria for selecting case studies for 
analyzing the effect of OTA as a source of science information, I explain why I chose 
NASA authorization, Superfund, and global warming for further analysis. Each issue 
received the attention of the committee both before and after the OTA was abolished and 
taken together the three issues provide a reasonably good blend of topics to study the 
extent to which the GOP politicized science after OTA disappeared from the scene. 
Overview of the OTA Activity 
On the verge of its abolition fiom Congress, OTA's proponents praised the 
agencies contributions to congressional deliberation. Senator Ted Kennedy (D-MA) 
stated, 
"Since its inception in 1972, OTA has served as the scientific arm of 
Congress. In the effort to spend the dollars more wisely, it seems to me 
that OTA is more critical today than ever before. OTA helps Congress 
determine what projects should be undertaken, streamlined and made more 
effective. It is often said that knowledge is power. Having the right 
information, the right knowledge, will allow us to better be able to make 
the right decisions. In this case, OTA provides us with the knowledge, 
gives us the'power (Kennedy, 1995, I)." 
Representative Connie Morella (R-MD) stated, 
"OTA's reports have led to important cost-saving innovations for our 
agencies as well. OTA's continued existence is critical to our resolution of 
complicated policy questions through an objective analysis of difficult 
issues (Morella, 1995, I)." 
From 1972 to 1995, the OTA published 721 reports on a wide variety of subjects, 
and OTA officials appeared as witnesses in congressional hearings 639 times. The 
OTA's participation in congressional deliberations increased over its 20 year life-span 
(see Figure 1). As was mentioned in Chapter I, the year 1980 represented a critical 
turning point for the OTA, after which the agency became a more frequent presence on 
Capitol Hill. The 1980 transformation in the OTA's congressional role correlates with 
some of the upheavals and changes which OTA director John H. Gibbons made to save 
the agency from downfall. During that same year, the OTA provided significant scientific 
advice to Congress on controversial issues such as the 1980 Energy Security Act, the 
Clean Air Act, the Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation, and 
Liability Act of 1980 (CERCLA or Superfund), and the Foreign Assistance Act 
(Houghton, 1995). In hearing before the House Committee on Science on July 25,2006, 
Representative Rush Holt (D-NJ) commented, 
"Although the OTA had its detractors, the OTA was a part of the 
Legislative Branch of the U.S. Government and existed to serve the 
Congress in one manner: scientific and technical advice for Congress. The 
OTA was able to elaborate on the broader context of an issue and inform 
the policy debate with assiduous and objective analysis of the policy 
consequences of alternative courses of action (Holt, 2006, I)." 
Figure 1 : OTA Activity (Witness Appearances and Published Reports), 1972 to 1996 
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** Data labels are above the points which they reference 
The data reveal a relationship between the number of OTA reports and the 
number of the OTA witness appearances before 1994. The average number of OTA 
witness appearances per year is approximately 26, with a standard deviation of 
approximately 15. Based on this analysis, we begin to see the decline in the OTA 
appearances in 1994, with the relationship ending in 1995 when the OTA makes more 
reports to Congress than ever before, but the number of hearings drops to the lowest 
levels since the late 1970s. By 1996 the OTA disappears as a source of information to 
Congress. The reports published by the OTA in 1995 most likely were requested during 
the 103'~ Congress, as reports generally were published within one to two years of 
request. The decline of OTA witnesses before the House committee on Science is not 
surprising, since Robert Walker (R-PA) replaced George E. Brown (D-CA) as Chair after 
the GOP took control of the House in 1995. A long standing OTA advocate, Brown was 
an industrial physicist, and was remembered upon his death as not only "a strong 
advocate for federal R&D, he was also someone who attempted to look beyond the 
conventional wisdom and challenge traditional thinking about science and technology 
and their role in society (NPACI, 1999, I)." Walker, an educator and Political Scientist 
by degree, had a negative view of the OTA, stating in 2001, "Its [OTA's] client was 
Congress, and that client was not satisfied that it was getting the information it needed 
when the need existed. And so, in 1995, Congress decided to look elsewhere for advice 
and counsel on matters relating to S&T (Walker, 2001)." Walker would have been the 
chairman formally inviting witnesses during the 104" Congress (1995-96). The 
decreased number of the OTA witness appearances correlates to our expectation that the 
GOP majority in Congress would call fewer OTA witnesses. While the OTA published 
an increased number of reports in 1995, they were not utilized in Congress. 
The House Committee on Science 
Between 1972 and 1995, the OTA testified before twenty-eight House 
committees, two joint committees, and twenty Senate committees, proving its broad 
presence as a source of scientific information for Congress. The OTA testified in 
hearings on a wide variety of issues, from oversight and budget renewal hearings to 
hearings on robotics, telecommunications, satellites, and USSR-US relations. The OTA's 
advice fostered debate and discussion from both sides of the issue. In an article in the 
New York Times, September 24th, 1995, Warren E. Leary stated, "During floor debates, 
the agency's reports were often quoted by both sides of an issue, supporters say, 
indicating that the agency was doing its job of supplying factual material to elevate the 
discussion ( ~ e ' k y ,  1995,26)." 
The OTA appeared more times on the House Committee on Science than any 
other committee in the Congress. Of the 639 appearances before congressional 
committees, the OTA appeared before the House Committee on Science 129 times. In 
general, the OTA appeared in front of House committees more often than Senate 
Committees, with 416 House appearances and 213 Senate appearances, and 10 joint 
committee appearances (see Table 1). The House Committee on Energy and Commerce 
and the House and Senate appropriations committees also called upon the OTA's 
expertise quite often, though not nearly as much as the House Committee on Science. 
Moreover, the Energy and Commerce agenda was quite narrowly focused on energy 
related issues and the appropriators mainly conducted oversight into expenditures.' 
Table 1 : OTA Appearances in Congressional Hearings 
by Committee and Chamber: 1972-1995 
Subsequent analysis shows that the majority of hearings before the Appropriations Committees can be 
classified as purely fiscal requests, in which the OTA provided background on a particular budgetary issue. 
The House Committee on Energy and Commerce is narrowly focused on issues pertaining to US energy 
policy, public health, and foreign and domestic trade. While the categories of "energy" and "commerce" 
are certainly relevant Issues of science policy, they do not encompass a broad range of the issues which are 
pertinent to science policy. 
 * Titles for Senate committees with corresponding jurisdictions but different titles than 
House committees are in parentheses 
Note: The OTA also appeared before two joint committees: Joint Economic Committee 
(8 times) and the Committee on the Organization of Congress (2 times). 
The House Committee on Science, with its broad jurisdiction over all issues of 
science and technology, is the best institution to analyze for a study interested in the 
degree of politicization in science in the wake of the OTA. The House Committee on 
Science (formerly the Science, Space and Technology Committee) is responsible for 
facilitating much of the legislative debate with regard to science and technology policy. 
Its official jurisdiction gives it responsibility "over all non-defense federal scientific 
research and development (R&D)" and charges it to ensure "that Federal tax dollars are 
being spent wisely and efficiently and that America's Federal science and technology 
enterprise maintains its world preeminence." Additionally, the Committee is responsible 
for proposing ways in which research and development can solve some of our nation's 
most pressing problems.10 The specific focus on science and technology, yet broad 
'Taken from the House Committee on Science website, accessed 16 December 2006,O€tic1al Jurisdiction 
of the Committee, h t t D : / i w w w . h o u s e . e o v i s c i e n c e / e o m m i t t e e i n m  , 
' O  Ibid 
jurisdiction over all issues pertaining to science and technology, makes the House 
Committee on Science an appropriate committee to test my hypotheses. 
As Figure 2, shows, the OTA appeared most often before this committee in the 
1980s and early 1990s. The-number of OTA hearings appears to oscillate between five 
and ten appearances per year during the ten year period before its downfall. The average 
number of OTA hearings is approximate five per year, with a standard deviation of four. 
The fmal substantive data point represents the year 1996, in which OTA produced its 
final report, and appeared before six hearings in the Science Committee. Of course, the 
OTA completely disappeared from the congressional scene on September 3oth, 1995. 
Figure 2: OTA appearances before the House Committee on Science, 1970 to 1995 
OTA Hearings before the House Committee on Science 
1965 1970 1975 1980 1985 1990 1995 2000 
Year 
Issues before the House Committee on Science 
The OTA demonstrated significant presence on the House Committee on Science 
on numerous issues ranging from animal testing standards to health care, to DOE budget 
and program reauthorization, to global warming and energy policies. Figure 3 
demonstrates the subjects on which the OTA testified most frequently (3 or more 
appearances) before the House Committee on Science. I selected three issues: NASA, 
Superfund (part of hazardous waste) and global warming." I based my selection on the 
consistency of the issue, before and after the fall of the OTA, the current relevance of the 
issue, and the OTA's presence on the issue. The issues range on a political spectrum 
from politically neutral in the case of NASA, to politically divided in the case of global 
warming. Superfund falls in the middle of the spectrum. Mooney hypothesizes that the 
politicization of science is comprehensive, across a wide range of issues. However, it is 
distinctly possible that the inherent political divide on the issues might affect the external 
politicization of the witness testimony. 
L I  Since the OTA testified more on DOE issues than any other issue, I considered using DOE for this study. 
Most DOE hearings pertained to a DOE budget renewal and OTA witnesses spoke about the degree of 
efficiency or lack thereof of the in DOE programs. Six out of the nine OTA appearances on the DOE are 
fiscal year DOE authorizations. While the terminology by which the congressional hearings are entitled 
changes in 1992 from "DOE Authorization" to "DOE Budget Authorization," the content is, for all 
practical puIposes, the same. The issues surrounding the DOE Budget authorization are roughly similar 
each year. However, the OTA does not testify in every hearing on DOE authorization during the years 
between 1985 and 1995, and in fact, does not even testify in a large portion of the hearings on DOE 
authorization. The OTA testifies in six out of the sixty-five hearings (slightly less than 10 percent) on this 
subject before the House Committee on Science between the years of 1985 and 1995. While in every other 
way, this issue would be ripe for consideration, the OTA's limited presence in these hearings makes it 
difficult to draw any conclusions about the politicization of scientific advice which direetly link to the 
demise of OTA. 
Figure 3: OTA Appearances before the House Committee on Science, by Subject, 
between 1972 and 1995 
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I collect data kom a standard time interval of ten years before the demise of the 
OTA (Jan. 1985-Sept. 1995) and ten years after the downfall of the OTA (Sept. 1995- 
Dec. 2005) 
Case Study 1: NASA Authorizations 
NASA authorizations are the second most frequently addressed subject on 
which the OTA testifies before the Science Committee. Ideally, congressional 
testimony on this issue should remain unaffected by the fall of the OTA. There is 
very little motivation for "twisting" the science; therefore, the witnesses' 
testimonies and the types of witnesses should not be significantly altered in the 
presence of a GOP majority. In 1958, Congressed passed the National 
Aeronautics and Space ~ c t " ,  authorizing the creation of the National Aeronautics 
and Space Administration (NASA). Section 102 of the Act lays out the goals and 
objectives of the agency, stating, 
(a) The Congress hereby declares that it is the policy of the United 
States that activities in space should be devoted to peaceful 
purposes for the benefit of all mankind. 
(b) The Congress declares that the general welfare and security of 
the United States require that adequate provision be made for 
aeronautical and space activities (NAS Act, 1958, Sec. 102). 
The act further specifies the responsibilities and functions of the agency in section 202 as, 
"(1) plan, direct, and conduct aeronautical and space activities; (2) arrange 
for participation by the scientific community in planning scientific 
measurements and observations to be made through use of aeronautical 
and space vehicles, and conduct or arrange for the conduct of such 
measurements and observations; (3) provide for the widest practicable and 
appropriate dissemination of information concerning its activities and the 
results thereof; (4) seek and encourage, to the maximum extent possible, 
the fullest commercial use of space; and (5) encourage and provide for 
Federal Government use of commercially provided space services and 
hardware, consistent with the requirements of the Federal Government." 
More important to this case study on NASA authorizations, the 1958 Act specifies 
in section 310: 
"Notwithstanding any other provision of law, the authorization of any 
appropriation to the Administration shall expire (unless an earlier 
expiration is specifically provided) at the close of the third fiscal year 
following the fiscal year in which the authorization was enacted, to the 
extent that such appropriation has not theretofore actually been made." 
Further, section 206 requires that the NASA Director report to Congress once a 
year with "a comprehensive description of the programmed activities and the 
accomplishments" and "an evaluation of such activities and accomplishments in terms of 
the attainment of, or the failure to attain, the objectives described in section 102(c) of this 
" TheNational Aeronautics and Space Act, Pub. L. No. 85 568,72 Stat. 426 438 (July. 29, 1958), As 
Amended. Accessed from the web, 21 Mareh 2007, 
http:llwww.nasa.aovlofficesloaclaboutisoace actl.htm1 
~ c t . " ' ~  This legislation sets the stage for the annual or semi-annual reports that I am 
studying. In essence, each hearing represents the testimony of the director of NASA to 
Congress on the previous year, and his or her request for funding in support of anticipated 
programs for the coming year. He or she seeks to validate the work that NASA has done 
and demonstrate that NASA's endeavors deserve to be funded in the upconiing year. 
The majority of the OTA testimonies on NASA are focused on NASA 
authorization hearings. In this case, the OTA testifies on four out of twenty-one hearings 
(slightly less than 20 percent) on NASA authorization between 1985 and 1995. The OTA 
also authored 21 reports on the subject of Space and Space Exploration, with four 
specifically focused on NASA policies. NASA budgets are eligible for re-evaluation 
every year. Further, NASA continued to play an important role in the development and 
research surrounding space exploration and earth sciences after 1995. Lisa J. Porter, the 
Associate Administrator of the Aeronautics Research Mission Directorate at NASA 
stated in September 2006, 
"Today, NASA's aeronautics research programs are positioned better than 
ever to provide meaningful and relevant research that is aligned with our 
National priorities. We are conducting high-quality, innovative, integrated 
research across the fundamental disciplines of aeronautics, creating 
revolutionary tools, concepts, and technologies that will lead to a safer, 
more environmentally friendly, and more efficient national air 
transportation system. At the same time, we are ensuring that aeronautics 
research and critical core competencies continue to play a vital role in 
support of the Vision for space Exploration. ~ a s t l ~ l  NASA's refocused 
aeronautics program is establishing strong partnerships with academia, 
industry and other Government agencies, and in doing so, we are ensuring 
that our world-class resources are readily available to them."I4 
l 3  ibid 
l4 Lisa J. Porter, Testimony before the House Committee on Science, Space and Aeronautics 
Subcommittee, September 26,2006 
Thus, NASA authorizations are a good case for this study: the hearing issues are constant 
over time, the OTA has a significant presence on the issue, before the House Committee 
on Science, and the case maintains significance before the Science Committee after the 
demise of the OTA. 
There are twenty-six hearings on NASA Authorization which I consider in this 
statistical analysis, fifteen of which are Volume I1 hearings.15 The Volume I and Volume 
11 hearings are similar in content; the second volume is merely a continuation of the 
hearing in the previous volume. NASA authorization is the least politically charged issue 
that I analyzed. The case represents the baseline for my analysis because I can apply the 
controls most effectively: the hearings are on the same issues, every year; the witnesses 
are very similar in affiliation and type; there is very little inherent political leaning in the 
issue itself; and the House Committee on Science hears most of testimonies on this issue. 
Case Study 2: Superfund 
The third and fourth issues in which the OTA presents significant testimony 
before the House Committee on Science are issues of energy and hazardous waste 
While both would be beneficial to study, the issue of energy is far too broad to focus a 
case study effectively: there is not a well-defined, narrow area of energy policy which 
lends itself to a carefully focused and systematic study of the OTA. In general, OTA 
reports on this subject were broad, including topics such as Energv in Developing 
Countries and Energv Use and the US Economy. Further, the OTA is not a particularly 
significant witness on this issue: there are five OTA appearances on energy policy 
'' I choose to focus the analysis that I present here on the Volume I1 hearings because the number of 
witnesses in Vol. I and Vol. I1 hearings is vastly different, yielding signiiicant statistical error, were I to 
consider both types in the same study. I selected Vol. I1 as opposed to Vol. I because (a) the OTA appears 
in Vol. I1 hearings, and (b) there are statistically fewer witnesses overall in Vol. I hearings, lending fewer 
available data points. 
between 1985 and 1995, out of a total of forty-one hearings on energy policy, 
withstanding hearings on the Department of Energy (DOE) budget authorizations. As a 
result, I chose instead to center on issues broadly categorized as hazardous waste, and 
specifically focused on the Superfund development. 
Background on Superfund 
The Superfund was created in 1980, under the Comprehensive Environmental 
Response, Compensation, and Liability (CERCLA) Act, which is more commonly known 
as the "~u~er fund" . ' ~  The Superfund is a focused and narrow part of the congressional 
dialogue about hazardous waste, centering on environmental cleanup, specifically for 
organizations that cannot self-fund the necessary measures of environmental action. The 
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) defines it as follows: 
"Congress established a Hazardous Substance Trust Fund, referred to as 
"Superfund," to pay for responses by the federal government to releases of 
hazardous substances in cases in which there are no viable potentially 
responsible parties (PRPs) or the PRPs are unable to pay for the response. 
EPA's "enforcement first" philosophy is designed to conserve Fund 
monies for such circumstances. In some cases, such as emergency actions, 
resources of the Fund are used to conduct cleanup, after which EPA 
pursues cost recovery from the responsible parties. The term "Superfund" 
is also often used to refer to the Comprehensive Environmental Response, 
Compensation and Liability Act (CERCLA), the law that created the 
Superfund cleanup program."'7 
The Department of Energy Office of Health, Safety, and Security summarized the 
CERCLA Act as follows: 
Under CERCLA Congress gave the federal government broad authority to 
regulate hazardous substances, to respond to hazardous substance 
emergencies, and to develop long-term solutions for the Nation's most 
serious hazardous waste problems. CERCLA also created a $1.6 billion 
I6 Last Accessed April 3, 2007. htl~://www.epa.eov/suuerfund/actionilaw/cercla.htm 
" EPA Questions and Answers, taken fiom the web 2 March 2007, 
httD://www.epa.eov/comuliance/resources/faas/cleanu~/super~~~en-faas.html 
Hazardous Substance Response Trust Fund. This fund, supported by an 
excise tax on feedstock chemicals and petroleum, was used to pay for 
cleanup activities at abandoned waste sites. The 1980 law requires the 
parties responsible for the contamination to conduct or pay for the 
cleanup. If the Environmental Protection Agency's (EPA's) efforts to take 
an enforcement action for the cleanup are not successful, the federal 
government can clean up a site using the CERCLA Trust Fund. If the 
Superfund program conducts the cleanup, the government can take court 
action against responsible parties to recover up to three times the cleanup 
costs. 18 
The National Contingency Plan (NCP) [40 Code of Federal Regulations [CFR] 
part 3001'~ guides the CERCLA response efforts, outlining two basic responses: removal 
action and remedial action.  emo oval actions focus on the immediate elimination, 
containment, treatment, disposal, or incineration of the hazardous waste in question. 
Remedial actions make up the majority of Superfund efforts and center upon creating a 
system of longer-term, sustainable solutions. Specific actions falling in this category 
include preliminary analysis, site inspections, the Hazard Ranking System (HRS), the 
National Priorities List (NPL), a feasibility study, and the actual remedial action.'' 
The Superfund legislation was reauthorized in 1986 and its standards of 
environmental efficiency were extended to include federal government facilities as well 
as private industries. The act was amended again in 1992, 1994, 1997,1999, and 2002 
with increased definitions for allowable actions, specifically on federally owned facilities. 
While Superfund receives portions of its revenue from the Trust Fund, it depends on 
yearly congressional authorizations to maintain its existence, receiving roughly fifty 
percent of its budget from general revenues. 
The OTA testified in two out of seven total hearings on Superfund, 
between 1985 and 1995. Hazardous waste, specifically limited to 
'' Last Accessed April 4,2007. ht tD: / /homer .oml .aov/nuclearsafe tv /nsea /  
'' ihid ..-- 
'a ibid 
Superfund issues, was the focus of four OTA reports, between 1985 and 
1989. The Superfund maintains its prominence after 1995; between 1995 
and 2005 there are two subsequent hearings on this subject before the 
Science Committee. 
The OTA testifies in a significant portion (more than 20 percent) of the hearings on the 
Superfund prior to 1995. 
The majority of the Superfund hearings which I consider focus on Research and 
Development (R&D) issues (7 out of 14 hearings), authorization of funding (2 out of 14 
hearings), or specific cleanup issues (5 out of 14 hearings). Superfimd is slightly more 
politically contentious than the NASA Authorization hearings because the issues are 
more environmentally sensitive, and span a wider range of actions than reviewing 
authorizations. The issues and technology remain relatively constant over the 20 year 
period. In comparison to the NASA authorizations, the Superfimd legislation has a left- 
ward leaning and contains a wider range of content. This case provides a good study of 
the OTA's presence before Congress because the OTA has played a significant historic 
role in the development of Superfimd Policy. 
The Superfund is another good case study because the issue is addressed directly 
by the OTA and remains relevant even after the OTA disappears. Further, the OTA 
testifies in a significant portion (more than 20 percent) of the hearings on the Superfimd 
prior to 1995. 
Case Study 3: Global Warming 
The issue of global warming often seems like it is over-emphasized in discussions 
of politicized science. However, to a certain degree, ignoring this issue would be 
equivalent to overlooking the metaphorical "elephant in the room." Thus, I selected 
global warming as a third case study. 
Chris Mooney titles his chapter on global warming "The Greatest Hoax," calling 
Senator James Inhofe's "scientific" speeches on the issue, in the words of Geophysical 
Fluid Dynamics Laboratory director Jerry D. Mahlman, "the kind of thing you write 
Monty Python skits about (Mooney, 2005,84)." Until the end of the 2oth century, there 
was very little consensus surrounding the issue of global warming, even in the scientific 
community. Even today, debate surrounding the issue is heated, particularly concerning 
the role of human activities in the production of greenhouse gases. 
In 2001, the National Academy of the Sciences published a monumental report 
on the matter, stating confidently that 
"Greenhouse gases are accumulating in Earth's atmosphere as a result of 
human activities, causing surface air temperatures and subsurface ocean 
temperatures to rise. Temperatures are, in fact, rising. The changes 
observed over the last several decades are likely mostly due to human 
activities, but we cannot rule out that some significant part of these 
changes are also a reflection of natural variability. Human-induced 
warming and associated sea level rises are expected to continue through 
the 21st century (NRC, 2001, I)." 
Global warming is defined as the observed increase in the average temperature of 
the earth's oceans and atmosphere. The National Oceanic and Atmospheric 
Administration indicated in their 2001 "State of the Climate" report (Shein, 2006, 
S l l )  that "based on the N O M C D C  record, the rise in global surface 
temperatures since 1900 is 0.66"C, when calculated as a linear trend." 
The key to understanding global warming is a basic comprehension of the 
greenhouse effect. The greenhouse effect has to do with the absorption and emission of 
solar, thermal, and infrared radiation. In essence, the amount of thermal radiation that the 
earth emits (upward radiation) has to be equal to the amount of solar radiation that the 
earth receives from the sun and the amount of infrared radiation which is reflected back 
to the earth by the greenhouse gases in the atmosphere. This is based on the basic laws of 
physics (Conservation of Energy, Stefan-Boltzmann Law of Blackbody radiation). If for 
some reason, the earth merely absorbed all of the sun's radiation; it would become 
infinitely hot and uninhabitable. Rather, the earth absorbs the energy and then reflects 
about 30% of the sun's radiation back into space. Greenhouse gases, in the earth's 
atmosphere, trap some of the upward thermal radiation, re-emitting it back down to the 
earth's surface, causing the surface of the earth to heat up. The greater the concentration 
of greenhouse gases in the earth's atmosphere, the more the earth warns up to balance 
the influx of thermal and infixed radiation. The greenhouse effect is presented on the 
EPA website with the following diagram and e~~lana t ion :~ '  
Figure 4: Greenhouse House Effect, EPA Diagram 
The Greenhouse Effect 
The Greenhouse Effect is beneficial to the inhabitants of the earth; it keeps the 
planet about 60 degrees Fahrenheit warmer than it would be otherwise, making the planet 
livable.22 However, if the greenhouse gases were to increase substantially, the 
inhabitants of the earth might find themselves with an atmosphere similar to that of 
Venus, with temperatures reaching nearly 800 degrees Fahrenheit. Venus has a very 
2 I Last Acccssc~l April 6. 2007. hnn: www.cna.euv clirlulcchar~ec scic~~cc i~ldcx.html 
2l Last A c c e * ~ e ~ I  A p r ~ l  6, 2007. http: cva.eov clim3tect.an,c klJs erecnhou*c.html 
thick greenhouse layer, reflecting most of the emitted thermal radiation back down to its 
surface, causing temperatures to rise exponentially. 
The EPA notes on their website2' (updated 19 October 2006) that scientists know 
with certainty that: 
Human activities are changing the composition of Earth's atmosphere. Increasing 
levels of greenhouse gases like carbon dioxide (CO2) in the atmosphere since pre- 
industrialtimes are well-documented and understood. 
The atmospheric buildup of CO2 and other greenhouse gases is largely the result 
of human activities such as the burning of fossil fuels. 
A warming trend of about 0.7 to 1.5"foccurred during the 20th century. 
Warming occurred in both the Northern and Southern Hemispheres, and over the 
- 
oceans (NRC, 2001). 
The major greenhouse gases emitted by human activities remain in the 
atmosphere for periods ranging from decades to centuries. It is therefore virtually 
certain that atmospheric concentrations of greenhouse gases will continue to rise 
over the next few decades. Increasing greenhouse gas concentrations tend to 
warm the planet. 
Dr. Jim Hansen, one of the world's leading climate scientists, observed in 2004, that the 
primary cause of the global warming phenomena is human-made greenhouse gases, 
"The largest change of climate forcings in recent centuries is caused by 
human-made greenhouse gases. Greenhouse gases in the atmosphere 
absorb heat radiation rather than letting it escape into space. In effect, they 
make the proverbial blanket thicker, returning more heat toward the 
ground rather than letting it escape to space. The earth then is radiating 
less energy to space than it absorbs from the sun. This temporary planetary 
energy imbalance results in the earth's gradual warming (Hansen, 2004, 
71)" 
The principal source of greenhouse gases comes from power processes, followed by 
industrial waste, and transportation fuels. Carbon dioxide is the most common 
greenhouse gas, with methane and nitrous oxide coming in second and third (IPCC 
Report, 2001). Water vapor and ozone also contribute significantly to the overall 
greenhouse gas concentration. 
23 Last Accessed April 6,2007. h~://www.e~a.eov/climatechanee/science/sbteo~owled~e.htd 
What scientists do not know is how serious the consequences of global warming 
will be, or how fast the temperature will change with increasing concentrations of 
greenhouse gases. Skeptics argue that a temperature change of less than a degree in the 
last century cannot have detrimental environmental impacts. Further, they argue that 
little is known about the seriousness of a few degrees increase in temperature. Global 
warming naturally raises controversy over its scientific validity, the depth of its gravity, 
and its potential impacts. Most policy debate surrounding the issue pertains to (a) the 
human role in the production of greenhouse gases, (b) the actions which should be taken 
against it, and (c) the validity of the science. The hearings which I consider on this issue 
consider similar policy debates. I look at 17 hearings on global warming, with titles such 
as "Nuclear Energy's Role: Improving U.S. Energy Security and Reducing Greenhouse 
Gas Emissions" and "Priorities in Global Climate Change Research." Thus, in spite of 
the scientific consensus on the presence and causes of global warming, uncertainty about 
its consequences subjects the issue to politics. 
Chris Mooney terms the issue of global warming "The Greatest Hoax," accusing 
Republican James Inhofe (Mooney, 2005,78) of following a strategy of "find experts 
'sympathetic to your view' and make them 'part of your message."' Further, Mooney 
suggests that Inhofe even goes as far as "manufacturing uncertainty" about Global 
Climate Change (82) and suppressing truth (95). The picture which Mooney paints of 
Inhofe is of a slightly deranged man, shouting "hoax" at every available moment. 
Mooney charges conservative scientists with having industry ties (Mooney, 2005, 87), 
congressmen with "stacking the bench" with their own experts (88), and the right with 
misinterpreting scientific fact (89). Mooney (92) states of Inhofe that he "...should not 
be allowed to pick and choose which parts . . . he likes or doesn't like." Mooney's 
) criticism (2005, 101) is severe, as he states, 
"If this situation is maddening, it is also tragic. There may be no other 
issue today where a corruption of the necessary relationship between 
science and political decision-making has more potentially disastrous 
consequences. And together, James Inhofe and the Bush administration 
have made that corruption systematic and complete. Not only do they 
strive to prevent the public from understanding the gravity of the climate 
situation, but in sowing confusion and uncertainty, they help prevent us 
from doing anything about it." 
Mooney's analysis is based on the individual interactions with or actions of 
policymakers and the administration. He does not conduct his analysis in a systematic 
way; rather he shows that the GOP Congress did rely on somewhat questionable evidence 
for its stance on global warming. Regardless of his sources or method, if this conclusion 
is correct, the implications for science policy decision making are grave. The deliberate 
twisting of science for a given agenda is unacceptable, especially when it is done by those 
in political power. If Mooney is correct, then hearings on global warming should become 
more politicized after 1994. 
The OTA appears as a witness in three out of eight hearings on global warming 
before the Science Committee between 1985 and 1995, and this issue is the main topic of 
four OTA reports, between 1991 and 1993. Global warming is subsequently addressed in 
the House Committee on Science in nine hearings after the demise of the OTA, between 
1995 and 2005. Although global warming is not the most frequently addressed subject 
by OTA or the House Committee on Science, the issue is high on the list of national 
priorities and, to some extent, still divides the parties. President George W. Bush, in his 
2007 State of the Union address recognized global warming as a "serious challenge," 
saying "America is on the verge of technological breakthroughs that will enable us to live 
our lives less dependent on oil. And these technologies will help us be better stewards of 
the environment, and they will help us to confront the serious challenge of global climate 
change (Bush, 2007)." Yet, in spite of Bush's recent interest in global warming, several 
prominent conservative Republicans dispute the scientific consensus that human 
activities contribute to global warming, while prominent Democrats traditionally 
advocate measures to reduce global warming. Global warming is quite often the issue 
used to demonstrate politicization of science. 
The subject of global warming is by far the most controversial of the three case 
studies which I have selected. On a continuum ranking the degree of political divisions 
within my issues, global warming falls at the far left, as the most politically divided issue 
that I consider. It is often accused of being a left-wing issue, promoted by liberals and 
environmentalists, such as A1 Gore (An Inconvenient Truth). I chose to focus on this issue 
as the third case study because of the accusations of its politicization. I use the analysis 
fiom the NASA and Superfund hearings to establish a model for the global warming data. 
I approach this controversial subject systematically, basing my analysis on the cases of 
NASA Authorization and Superfund so that the analysis of Global warming is as bias- 
free as possible. 
Conclusion 
Because of the innately politicized nature of global warming, it serves as a critical 
test case for my analysis. If science policy has became more politicized on Capital Hill 
with the rise of the Republican majority in the House after 1994, then hearings before the 
House Committee on Science are likely to reflect this development. The other two case 
studies are less politically divided and as a result, they would be less susceptible to 
politicization. The first two case studies provide a measure of the politicization and 
 
policy change which occurred as a result of the downfall of the OTA. Using this 
baseline, I can systematically look at the more contentious issue of global warming. 
I have selected these three case studies as such because they enable me to 
maximize control over the variables in my study and achieve an ideal variability across 
the issues. By controlling for the committee and establishing case studies in which the 
OTA had a significant presence prior to its demise, I create a systematic method of study 
in which I can effectively quantify the change in the sources which Congress relies upon 
for scientific information. In the next chapter, I put my hypotheses to the test by 
analyzing the sources of information that Congress relies upon in the areas of NASA 
authorizations, Superfund, and global warming. 
CHAPTER 111: CASE STUDIES 
If the demise of the OTA and the emergence of a Republican majority in the 
House of Representatives led to a politicization of science, we should observe changes in 
policy deliberation on the House Committee on Science. First, the Committee would 
receive more of its information from politicized sources. Second, the organizations that 
testified from 1995 to 2005 would not substitute for the OTA's objective and unbiased 
information to Congress from 1972 to 1995. Third, we would see an increase in the 
number of organizations that endorse GOP-specific priorities. This chapter tests these 
hypotheses by comparing the types of witnesses which are called to testify on the House 
Committee on Science for NASA authorization, Superfund, and global warming before 
and after the demise of the OTA. This comparison allows me to characterize the change 
in the sources of scientific information after the fall of the OTA. The w~tnesses are 
placed in one of seven categories: academic, government, industry, interest group, 
laboratory, research, or other. I begin by defining these categories. Then I analyze 
changes in the presence of each type of witness in committee testimony for all three 
issues from 1985 to 2005. The data support my first and second hypothesis in one of 
three cases, and support the third in all three cases. 
Types of Witnesses 
The types of w~tnesses to appear before the House Committee on Science can be 
classified in terms of seven categories: (1) Academic, (2) Laboratory, (3) Research, (4) 
Interest Group, (5) Industry, (6)  Government, and (7) Other. I use these characterizations 
for all three case studies. Further, I separate the witness classifications based around the 
definition of "politicization" which I used to create the hypothesis in chapter I, further 
expounded in this section. Though witnesses from each of the seven categories have 
distinct characteristics, the witness classifications of interest group and industry can be 
combined as "politicized" witnesses; the witness categories of academic, laboratory, and 
research can be combined to form "non-politicized" witnesses. Government and other 
witnesses are classified in a separate category. The government witnesses, in particular, 
are separated out because they represent a mixed degree of politicization: some of the 
government witnesses are political appointees, rendering them inherently politically 
defined; others are research scientists employed by the government. This category 
cannot be neatly summarized as politicized or non-politicized. 
The academic category indicates an individual or organization which is affiliated 
with a university or college. These are individuals such as faculty of universities, 
professors, and members of associations of universities. An example of this classification 
can be seen in the case study of NASA Authorization, under witness Peter M. Banks, 
who is given the title of "Electrical Engineering Professor, Stanford University." 
Academic witnesses are typically either professors of physics or related earth sciences. 
There are exceptions to this rule, however, including one political science professor 
(W.D. Kay) who was called as a witness in the 1997 NASA Authorization. Though 
academic witnesses are associated with a college or university, they speak with 
independent voices. 
Laboratory witnesses are research scientists affiliated with national laboratories. 
They appear almost exclusively in the hearings on global warming. These witnesses are 
research scientists who are not affiliated with a university or college, but instead are part 
of a research collaboration at a national laboratory. Examples of this type of witness 
include John T. Whetten, Associate Director of Energy and Technology at Los Alamos 
 National Laboratory, and Charles V. Shank, the Director of Lawrence Berkeley 
Laboratory. 
The activities surrounding the research category are the focus of this particular 
study. If Chris Mooney is correct and science policy is becoming less research-based, 
and more deeply politicized, we expect to see the most change within this category. 
Research-based witnesses include those who are affiliated with the four sources of 
congressional research science as specified by Bruce Bimber (28): the GAO, the CRS, 
the CBO, and the OTA. In addition, research witnesses include those from the National 
Academy of the Sciences (NAS), the National Research Council (NRC), or non-partisan 
think tanks and research institutes such as the Scripps Institute for Oceanography. 
 
Finally, academic witnesses are distinguished from research witnesses because they are 
not expressly linked to a congressional research service, or to an organization whose 
unique purpose is to provide research and information. 
The academic, laboratory, and research witnesses make up the group of witnesses 
classified as "unbiased" or "non-politicized." While scientists can certainly have agendas 
or biases, as highlighted by F. James Sensenbrenner in chapter 1, they are far less likely 
to be politically swayed than individuals who are either directly affiliated with a 
government agency, or receive their primary salaries from a group with a particular 
political agenda, or a corporation which has a financial stake in the decision- outcome. 
Interest group witnesses are typically affiliated with advocacy groups, which 
focus on a specific topic or area of policy, and do not produce a good or service. 
Examples of this type of witness could be Steven H. Flajser, the chairman of the 
 
Aerospace R&D Committee at the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
 (IEEE), and Lori B. Garver, who is the Executive Director of the National Space Society 
(NSS). The IEEE defmes itself as, "a non-profit organization.. . the world's leading 
professional association for the advancement of technology."24 Similarly, the NSS 
purpose statement, says that "The National Space Society (NSS) is an independent, 
educational, grassroots nonprofit organization dedicated to the creation of a space-faring 
civilizati~n."~~ Interest groups are distinguished from research organizations in that they 
are narrowly focused on a specific issue or area of interest, and the information they 
provide reflects their particular interests. This category would also include unions and 
non-governmental coalitions and councils. 
An industry-related witness receives a salary from an organization or corporation 
 
which produces a good or service used by or under scrutiny the individuals affiliated with 
the issue in question. Good examples of industry witnesses can be seen in the global 
warming hearings under Robert C. Berglund, the manager of the Advanced ~uc lea r  
Technology Operations at General Electric Co., and L. Daniel Mears, who is the General 
Manager of Gas-Cooled Reactor Associates. These are differentiated from the interest 
group witnesses, which do not produce a good or service and are devoted to advocacy for 
a particular field. More importantly, industry groups are often distinguished from the 
interest groups in tams of profit: industry groups make a profit; often interest groups do 
not. 
The categories of interest group and industry are defined as the innately 
"politicized" witnesses. These groups may use scientific findings, but they advocate 
l4 Last Accessed April 4,2007.  httn: www.icec.orx wch ahoutus home index.htm1 
" Last Accessed April 4,2007.  httu: www.nSs.org ahour 
positions based on their group's concerns or their business interests. They do not provide 
unbiased analysis, but are generally called because they have a specific advocacy interest 
in the topic of debate. 
The government witnesses receive their primary salary from a specific 
governmental agency or department. This category would include witnesses who are 
affiliated with NASA, the Air Force, the Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
(DARPA), the Department of Commerce, the National Institutes of Health (NIH), the 
Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), the Department of Defense, state and local 
government officials, and Representatives and Senators. This category also includes 
agencies such as the Office of Budget Management (OMB) and the Office of Science and 
Technology Policy (OSTP), whose administrators are appointed by the   resident.^^ 
Though OMB and OSTP are the executive parallel to Bimber's four legislative research 
organizations, the heads of the agency are political appointees, and their primary budget 
source is governmental. Thus, they are categorized as government witnesses. 
Government witnesses are classified in their own separate category of 
politicization. A number of government officials are political appointees, such as the 
NASA Administrator, a position filled by President George H.W. Bush's appointee, 
Danfel Goldin. The heads of the OMB, OSTP, and NSF are also appointed by the 
President. While their appointment have to be confirmed by the Senate, the nature of 
their relationship to the administration in power necessitates that they are considered 
separately from the other witnesses. These positions are designed to be politically 
26 There are a few notable exceptions to the "Government" classification. These include the Congressional 
Researeh Service (CRS), the General Accounting Office (GAO), the Congressional Budget Office (CBO), 
and the Office of Technology Assessment (OTA), which B N C ~  Bimber characterizes as government 
research organizations which pro~ide objective. independent advice to Congess (Bimbr, 1996, p.28). 
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unbiased; however, by nature the heads of each agency are distinctly affiliated with an 
administration of a particular political party Thus, govemment witnesses are considered 
separately from "politicized" and "non-politicized" categories. 
Finally, the categorization of other is used to delineate sources which do not 
clearly fit into any other category. These anomalies include witnesses such as Richard 
Rhodes, a journalist and historian; Valeri A. Troitskaya, the chairman of the Scientific 
Council for Geomagnetism at the Soviet Academy of Sciences, USSR; or Gail Hanks, 
whose affiliation is "registered nurse." This classification is somewhat of a broad "catch- 
all" category, designed to reduce the number of categories to a manageable number; as 
such, it cannot be reliably defined in terms of biased or unbiased motives. Using these 
categories, we can analyze the hearings on NASA authorization, Superfund, and global 
warming. 
Data Analysis 
The politicization of science, as understood throughout this study, can be 
measured by an increase in the overall percentages of interest group and industry related 
witnesses before the House Committee on Science. I analyze the overall witness trends 
for each issue, before and after the fall of the OTA. First, I separate the types of 
witnesses into four categories: politicized witnesses (industry and interest groups), non- 
politicized witnesses (academic, laboratory, and research), government witnesses, and 
"other" witnesses. Then I compare the different sources to determine if scientific 
information has become more politicized with the fall of the OTA, demonstrated in 
Tables 1,2, and 3. 
. Number of Witnesses (Percentage of total witnesses) 
Table 1: Politicization in NASA Authorizations, pre & post OTA 






Table 2: Politicization in Superfund, pre & post OTA 
Politicization of Superfund Witnesses I OTA / Post-OTA 


















54 (46%) 1 6 (60%) 
From these data, we can state that in the cases of NASA and Superfund, the witness 
trends indicate a decrease in the politicization of scientific information. In the case of 
Number of Witnesses (Percentage of total witnesses) 









I 0  (1 00%) 
4 (4%) 1 2 (3%) 
decrease in the percentage of government witnesses. In the case of Superfund, we see an 
increase in the percentage of government witnesses. In the case of global warming, the 
Total ( 102 (100%) 1 61 (100%) 
. Number of Witnesses (Percentage of total witnesses) 
witness trends designate an increase in the politicization of scientific advice, as well as an 
increase in the percentage of government witnesses. 
A second trend which emerges from the data is an overall decrease in the number 
of witnesses and hearings on each of these issues. In the case of NASA, the number of 
witnesses is reduced by a factor of four; in the case of Superfund, the number of 
witnesses drops by a factor of twelve; finally, in the case of global warming, the number 
of witnesses is halved. The number of hearings on NASA (eleven before, four after) and 
Superfund (eleven before, three after) also decreases. In the case of global warming, the 
number of hearings actually increases after 1995 (seven before, ten after) but the number 
of witnesses decreases by a factor of two. This trend is striking, because it indicates that 
Congress is not just calling its own witnesses; it is also blatantly not calling witnesses. 
Based on the results in these general categories, I infer that my initial hypothesis 
is only partially correct. The increase in politicization for global warming [Tables 3 and 
61 is consistent with my expectations, but the witnesses for Superfund and NASA do not 
follow the expected trends. Yet, because so much change under NASA occurs in the 
govemment category, which may contain either biased or unbiased sources, we should 
take a closer look at movements within the specific categories. A more refined analysis is 
necessary to provide the details necessary to fully analyze the change in the politicization 
of science. I separate the categories of "politicized," "non-politicized" and "govemment" 
into the seven original categories, and look more specifically at the witness affiliations 
and organizations which are present in the hearings. 
My analysis examines three trends: (1) the percentages of witnesses by type, 
before and after the demise of the OTA, (2) the research-based witness trends; and (3) the 
particular witnesses in the govemment and interest group data. 
Witness Percentages Before and After the OTA 
The frst stage of analysis compares the overall percentages of witnesses by 
category, before the fall of the OTA and after the fall of the OTA. This stage of the 
analysis allows me to observe the difference in the overall percentages on both sides of 
the transition year. Table 4 demonstrates the percentages per category for NASA 
Authorizations before 1995 in comparison to the percentages per category after 1995. 
Table 4: Witness Type Trends for Vol. I1 NASA Authorization hearings, pre & post 1995 
Witness Type OTA I POST-OTA 




I Total 1 272 (100%) 1 77 (100%) 1 




The contrast between the percentages of witnesses during the time of the OTA and after 
157 (58%) 
27 (1 0%) 
49 (1 8%) 
the OTA is highlighted in Table 4. The percentage of academic witnesses triples and the 
40 (52%) 
5 (6%) 









industry, and interest group witnesses decrease slightly; and the miniscule number of 
laboratory witnesses disappears completely, as do those classified as "other." 
The results of superfund hearings are presented in Table 5. I apply the same form 
of analysis to these as to the NASA authorization hearings. 
Table 5: Witness Type Trends for Superfund Hearings, pre & post 1995 
Government 





The data in Table 5 show that the percentage of academic, industry, and "other" 









( ) 10 100% 
percentage of government witnesses also increases. These findings are similar to those 
 for the NASA authorizations, with the exception of the government and academic 
percentages, which follow opposite trend lines. The key point fiom this section of 
analysis is that both cases reflect an increase in the percentage of research based 
witnesses and decreases in the percentages of industry and interest group witnesses. 
The overall percentage trends for global warming are shown in Table 6. 







Table 6 demonstrates that the percentage of government witnesses increased 
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substantially, fiom 27% pre-1995 to 41% post-1995. Similarly, the percentages of 
POST-OTA 
9 (1 5%) 
25 (41 %) 
15 (1 5%) 
8 (8%) 
11 (11%) 




Number of Witnesses (Percentage of total witnesses) 
4 (4%) 
22 (21 %) 
102 (100%) 




the percentage of laboratory witnesses disappeared entirely. The two unique trends 
within this data set are the increased percentage of interest group witnesses, and the 
decreased percentage of research-based witnesses. These trends do not mirror those 
observed in the NASA data or the Superfund data. 
In all three cases, the percentage of industry groups, laboratory groups, and 
"other" witnesses decreases after 1995. The increase in the percentage of interest group 
witnesses for global warming is expected, but the concurrent increase in the percentage of 
academic witnesses is surprising. Mooney's suggestion is that Congress recruits 
academics with industry-backing, to fill this category. This claim, however, is not 
investigated in depth within this study. 
Finally, consideration of the witness percentages across the three issues 
demonstrates that the general percentage of government witnesses is higher for NASA 
and superfund hearings. In both cases, before and after, the percentage of government 
witnesses is around 50 percent. In contrast, global warming hearings call roughly 30 
percent of their witnesses kom the government. Interest group witnesses make up 
between 10 and 20 percent of the witnesses for NASA and Superfund, whereas they 
constitute 10 percent for global warmingprior to 1995 and approximately 30 percent 
after 1995. In other words, while the data indicate a significant change in the 
politicization of the global warming issue, it is not completely valid to say that global 
 
warming is more politicized than NASA or superfund. Rather, the data show that the 
change in politicization has been greater in the area of global warming 
Research Witness Trends 
The third stage of analysis looks specifically at the trends within the research 
category. If the deliberation on the House Committee on Science became more 
politicized after 1995, the type of information that the OTA provided would not be 
replaced when the OTA disappeared kom the scene. The next stage of the analysis 
allows me to consider whether the sources of OTA information were replaced, and if so, 
which source of information served as the replacement. 
Table 7 demonstrates the research witnesses present for the Volume 11 NASA 
hearings, categorized by the year of the hearing. Authorization hearings operate on the 
basis o f  a fiscal year; the hearing takes place a year before the authorization w i l l  go into 
 
effect. For example, a FY1998 hearing would take place in 1997. 
Table 7: Research Witnesses by Affiliation, N A S A  Authorization, 1985-2005 
Research Witnesses Present I Hearing Date 
Conaressional Budaet Office (CBO) I 
~ational Center foritmospheric ~esearch (NCAR) 
National Research Council (NRC) 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
National Research Council (NRC) 
National Academy of the Sciences (NAS) 










None Present 1991 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
National Research Council (NRC) 
Congressional Budget Off~ce (CBO) 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 





National Research Council (NRC) 
The National Research Council (NRC) is the most frequently appearing research- 
National Research Council (NRC) 
1997 
Potomac Institute for ~ o l i c ~ ' ~ t u d i e s  (PIPS) 
Congressional Research Service (CRS) 
National Research Council (x 3) (NRC) 
National Center for Geographical Information and Analysis (NCGIA) 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
based witness for N A S A  Authorization, appearing in eight out o f  fifteen authorization 
1992 
National Research Council (NRC) I 
1999 
2000 
hearings. The N R C  and the OTA each appear in four out o f  the eleven hearings prior to 
1995. At least one o f  them is present in every pre-1995 hearing in which a research 
witness i s  called. Prior to 1995, the N R C  and the O T A  appear to share the responsibility 
o f  representing the research-based opinion in N A S A  Authorization hearings; neither 
takes preeminence. After 1995, the N R C  maintains the responsibilities which it shared 
with the O T A  prior to  1995. The Government Accountability Office (GAO) appears as a 
new witness in 1995, and returns in 2000; In addition, the committee calls on PIPS and 
NCGIA, two non-profit research based organizations, post-1995. 
The PIPS organization is particularly interesting. It makes every attempt 
to be non-partisan, focusing specifically on broad issues related to science and 
technology. PIPS identifies its purpose as: 
"The Institute identifies and aggressively shepherds discussion on key 
science and technology issues facing our society, providing in particular, 
an academic forum for the study of related policy issues. From these 
discussions and forums, we develop meaningful science and technology 
policy options and ensure their implementation at the intersection of 
business and government."27 
The objectives of PIPS, while not as time-weathered as those of the OTA, appear 
remarkably similar: 
"First, we fiercely maintain objectivity and credibility, remaining 
independent of any federal or state agency, and owing no special 
allegiance to any single political party or private concern. This dedication 
to fierce objectivity is evident in our motto, Integrum Se Servare. We 
make every attempt to ensure that our work is conducted in an unbiased 
manner, regardless of the opinions of sponsors, or even self-interest. This 
often enables fruitful inquiries into issues that might otherwise be difficult 
to assess. Second, we seek extensive collaboration with similar 
organizations, as well as with industry, academia, and government, and we 
work closely with Congress and the Executive  ranch."^^ 
Stephanie L. Tennyson, of PIPS suggests that perhaps the similarities between the 
OTA and PIPS are not unintentional. She writes, 
"The Potomac Institute for Policy Studies is an independent, 501(c) (3), 
not-for-profit public policy research institute founded in 1994 in the wake 
of the disestablishment of the Congressional Office of Technology 
Assessment (OTA). The Institute identifies and aggressively shepherds 
'' Last Accessed March 31,2007. httu://www.~otomacinstitute.oreiaboutus/s.htm 
28 Ibid 
discussion on key issues facing our society, particularly those associated 
with innovation (Tennyson, 2004,3)." 
The presence of PIPS, alongside the NRC and NCGIA, suggests that Congress 
still feels the need for an objective source of scientific information similar to the 
OTA. The NRC and the OTA appear to share responsibilities for a certain type of 
testimony, prior to 1995; after 1995, the OTA disappears, and the NRC, PIPS, and 
NCGIA take over the responsibility for that type of testimony. 
Table 8 represents the affiliations of the research-based witnesses who were 
called to give testimony on issues regarding the Superfund. These hearings differ slightly 
from those on the NASA Authorization, because there are far fewer witnesses in each 
hearing. Thus, the presence of one or two research witnesses in a hearing could represent 
anywhere from nine percent of the total witnesses to thirty-three percent, depending on 
the size of the hearing. 
Table 8: Research Witnesses by Affiliation, Superfund Hearings 1985-2005 
None Present Jan-86 
Southwest Research and Information Center 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
None Present 
None Present 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
Research Witnesses Present 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 









Government Accountability Office (GAO) I Mar-99 
Northeast Hazardous Substance Research Center (HSRC) I Oct-99 
Office of Technology ~ssessment (OTA) 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
None Present 




The OTA is by far the most commonly recognized research-witness on the issue 
of Superfund, appearing six times in four out of fourteen hearings on the subject. The 
GAO follows, with three appearances in three hearings. While the NASA Authorization 
case shows a clear relationship between the NRC and the OTA roles, Superfund is not 
nearly as clear cut. The GAO appears to be the closest corollary to an OTA replacement. 
The other research-based sources are region-specific, and appear only in hearings with 
regard to a particular geographic area. The Southwest Research and Information Center 
is a regional center, "founded in 1971 for the purpose of providing information to the 
public on the effects of energy development and resource exploitation on the people and 
their cultures, lands, water, and air of New Mexico and the ~outhwes t . "~~ Likewise, the 
Northeast Hazardous Substance Research Center is one of five regional research centers, 
existing for the express purpose of bringing together "researchers ffom a variety of 
disciplines to collaborate on integrated research projects, which involve practical 
problems of hazardous substance management as well as long-term, exploratory 
research."30 In the case of NASA, there are clear replacements in the category of research 
in hearing testimonies post-OTA; in the case of Superfund, we can see a clear absence of 
the OTA after 1995 with the GAO possibly providing an alternate source of information. 
In other words, we see a partial substitution for the testimonies of the OTA, post-1995. 
Table 9 details the presence of each research-based witness on the issue of global 
warming. 
Table 9: Research Witnesses by Affiliation, Global Warming, 1985-2005 
I Research Witnesses Present I Hearing Date I 
29 (Retrieved 28 March 2007): httu://www.sric.ord 
'O (Retrieved 28 March 2007): hm://www.hsrc.ord 
National Academy of the Sciences (NAS) 
National Center for Atmospheric Research (NCAR) 
Ill Water Survey (IWS) 
Scientific Research Society (SRS) 
World Meteorological Organization (WMO) 
Resources for the Future (RF) 
Global Atmospheric Research Program (GARP) 
Woods Hole Research Center (WHRC) 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
Rocky Mountain lnstitute (RMI) 
Electric Power Research lnstitute (EPRI) 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
National Academy of the Sciences (NAS) 
Solar Energy Research lnstitute (SERI) 
Office of Technology Assessment (OTA) 
National Academy of the Sciences (NAS) 
Electric Power Research lnstitute (EPRI) 
National Academy of the Sciences (NAS) 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
Scripps Institution of Oceanography (SIO) 
None Present I Sep-99 I 
None Present 1 Oct-99 








Nuclear Energy lnstitute (NEI) 
National Research Council (NRC) 
Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI) 
Coal Utilization Research Council (CURC) 
Government Accountability Office (GAO) 
The interesting point to note from this table is that the OTA does not play a significant 
Jun-01 
Jul-02 
role in testimony concerning the issue o f  global warming. Even before 1995, the OTA 
does not have much o f  a presence on this issue. In the years prior to 1995, the OTA 
appears in three out o f  eight hearings pertaining to global warming. It is often 
accompanied b y  the NAS. Prior to 1995, in hearings in which one o f  these two is not 
present, the research witnesses were often specifically geared toward a particular type o f  
energy research, such as electric power, or solar energy. However, the hearings in 1991, 
in which the research witnesses are specifically limited to a particular field o f  energy 
research, are general hearings on the issue of global warming. The heanngs are not 
focused on a particular type of energy, which would necessitate witnesses explicitly 
focused within a specific field. 
The global warming hearings following the demise of the OTA often lack 
research-based witnesses. There does not appear to be a specific pattern to the types of 
witnesses in hearings on this subject; after 1995 the GAO appears twice, and the NEI 
appears twice. While in the case of NASA we see a fairly clear replacement source for 
the OTA, this is not the case for global warming, where there is an explicit drop in the 
number of research witnesses. In the ten year period prior to 1995, every hearing on 
global warming has at least one research-based witness present. In the years after 1995, 
only four out of ten hearings on the subject have a research witness present. As the 
trends from the first and second stage of analysis indicate, the numbers of laboratory and 
academic witnesses are also greatly diminished. In other words, the purely research 
based witnesses are not being replaced by academic or laboratory witnesses. Rather, they 
appear to be replaced with government or interest group witnesses. This trend is the 
closest example of punctuated equilibrium, in which the percentage of research witness 
drops sharply from the GOP takeover of the House 1995 and concurrent demise of the 
OTA. 
In sum, this portion of the analysis reveals that in the case of NASA 
Authorizations, the OTA had significant presence, but was replaced, upon its demise, by 
the NRC, NCGIA and PIPS. The need for an OTA-like agency is revealed in the 
presence of PIPS, after the disappearance of the OTA. This fact shows that Congress was 
still looking for OTA-type information, even after the agency had been removed from the 
Congressional scene. In the case of Superfund, the OTA played a substantial role and 
appears to have been partially substituted by the GAO after 1995. Finally, in the case of 
global warming, the OTA does not appear to have played a substantial role, even during 
the years from 1985 to 1995. In the years immediately following 1995, there is a 
complete absence of research witnesses. Not only is the OTA not replaced, but the other 
research witnesses which had been present alongside the OTA also disappeared. 
Government and Interest Group Categories 
The consideration of the research-based witnesses allows us to draw conclusions 
about the overall politicization of science. However, the changes which occur within the 
government category and the interest group category reflect changes in partisan bias. In 
particular, I note witness disappearances after 1995, and witness appearances in the years 
following 1995. A complete table of acronyms can be found in Appendix A and the 
complete table of the government and interest group witnesses across all three issues can 
be found in Appendix B. 
The first trend which I discovered upon a closer analysis of the government and 
interest group witness data pertained to the presence of Representatives and Senators on 
particular hearings. Hearings for both NASA and Superfund demonstrated substantial 
Congress-member testimony prior to 1995. After 1995, these witnesses disappeared; 
Congress was not calling its own members to testify on either of these issues in the years 
following the OTA. Conversely, in the case of global warming, the number of 
Representatives and Senators offering testimony followed an inverse trend: no members 
testified prior to 1995 and an increased number testified after 1995. Prior to 1995, three 
republican and five democratic Congress members testified on NASA. There are four 
democrats who testified on the issue of Superfund. In contrast, after 1995, three of the 
four Congress members testifying on global warming were republicans. The democrat, 
Joseph Lieberman @-CT), is staunchly opposed to global warming, and is an outspoken 
advocate of taking action to prevent further climate change. He is, however, self-defined 
as an independent democrat, and often aligns with the Republican Party on policy issues. 
The data seem to indicate a decrease in the democratic leaning of government witnesses 
for NASA and Superfund and a concurrent increase in republican influence on global 
warming. 
NASA authorization interest groups demonstrate an increased conservative 
leaning. In particular, we note that the American Institute of Aeronautics and 
Astronautics (AIAA), the Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers (IEEE), the 
National Space Society (NSS), and the American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
(ASME) disappear from the witness lists, and the Aerospace States Association (ASA), 
the United Space Alliance (USA), and the Cato Institute appear. The AIAA was 
established in 1963, and commits itself to "To advance the arts, sciences, and technology 
of aeronautics and astronautics, and to promote the professionalism of those engaged in 
these pursuits."31 It seeks to achieve this purpose as follows: 
AIAA encourages original research . . . furthers dissemination of new 
knowledge . . . fosters the professional development of those engaged in 
science and engineering . . . improves public understanding of aerospace 
and its contributions . . . fosters education in engineering and science . . . 
promotes communication among engineers, scientists, and other 
professional groups . . . and stimulates outstanding professional 
a~com~lishments .~~ 
'' Last Accessed April 2, 2007. httv://www.aiaa.ordcontent.cfm?pa~eid=189 
'' ibid 
In contrast, the CAT0 Institute is a traditionally libertarian institution, self-defining its 
purpose as, "The Cato Institute seeks to broaden the parameters of public policy debate to 
allow consideration of the traditional American principles of limited government, 
individual liberty, free markets and peace."33 The IEEE "a non-profit organization, is the 
world's leading professional association for the advancement of technology."34 
Conversely, the ASA is "a bi-partisan representative of the grass roots of American 
Aerospace. It is a scientific and educational organization of Lieutenant Governors and 
Governor-appointed delegates."3s Thus, even within the category of interest groups, we 
see different trends in the types of interest groups that are called to testify on the issue of 
NASA Authorization. The trend indicates favoritism towards grassroots and principled 
organizations, as opposed to professional societies. The presence of Cato as a witness 
reflects the increased conservatism of the GOP majority in Congress. 
The Superfund data are hard to analyze in terms of the change in interest groups. 
There are very few interest group witnesses present after the fall of the OTA, therefore 
we can only make statements about which witnesses disappear in 1995. In particular, the 
Hazardous Waste Treatment Council (HWTC) and Natural Resources Defense Council 
(NRDC) disappear. The HWTC is the primary representative for most large hazardous 
waste management f r n ~ . ' ~  The NRDC is a liberally slanted environmental defense 
organization, which is devoted to achieving the following: 
"The Natural Resources Defense Council's purpose is to safeguard the 
Earth: its people, its plants and animals and the natural systems on which 
all life depends.. . We work to foster the fundamental right of all people to 
have a voice in decisions that affect their environment. We seek to break 
33 Last Accessed April 2,2007. htt~:llwww.cato.ore/about/about.html 
j 4  ..Last Accessed April 2,2007. htt~:/lwww.ieee.oralweb/abou~s/home/inde~.html 
3, Last Accessed April 2,2007. htb://www.aerostates.orp/ 
36 Last Accessed Apnl2,2007. htb://um.lincs.net/saniour/Revolvinr.htm 
down the pattern of disproportionate environmental burdens borne by 
people of color and others who face social or economic inequities."37 
Thus, in the case of Superfund, liberal interest groups do not reappear in hearings 
after 1995, and, unlike NASA authorizations, are not replaced with another form of 
interest group. The data set is so small, however, that it is difficult to draw determinant 
conclusions about the politicization trends within the interest group category. 
Global warming demonstrates a disappearance of the World Resources Institute 
(WRI), the American Society of Mechanical Engineers (ASME), the American Nuclear 
Energy Council (ANEC), and Gas Research Institute (GRI), and an increase in the 
presence of the Charles River Associates (CRA), United Mine Workers Association 
(UMWA), US Public Interest Research Group (USPIR), American Petroleum Institute 
(API), Competitive Enterprise Institute (CEI), and Council for Global Climate Change 
(GCC). Chris Mooney highlights the API (2005, 82), CEI (95), and GCC (81) as partisan 
organizations, who received substantial industry funding in support of their anti-global 
warming campaigns. Their presence in hearings after 1995 supports Mooney's 
hypothesis that the science presented in hearings on global warming was increasingly 
politicized. In contrast, the WRI defines itself as "an environmental think tank that goes 
beyond research to find practical ways to protect the earth and improve people's lives."38 
The ANEC is a component part of the Nuclear Energy Institute (NEI), which is ". . . the 
policy organization of the nuclear energy and technologies industry and participates in 
both the national and global policy-making process. NEI's objective is to ensure the 
formation of policies that promote the beneficial uses of nuclear energy and technologies 
'' Last Accessed April 2,2007. h~://www.nrdc.ordaboutirnission.as~ 
Last Accessed April 2,2007. h~://www.wi.ordabouti 
in the United States and around the world."39 The ASME was "Founded in 1880 as the 
American Society of Mechanical Engineers, today's ASME is a 120,000-member 
professional organization focused on technical, educational and research issues of the 
engineering and technology community."40 
The data for global warming interest group and government witnesses 
seem to support both Mooney's claims and the results of my statistical analysis. 
Not only do we see an increase in the overall politicization, but we also see an 
increase in the political leanings of the witnesses themselves, within the interest 
group category and the government category. 
Summary of Chapter I11 
The data presented in this chapter demonstrate an increase in the overall 
politicization of the issue of global warming, as well as a decrease in the politicization of 
the issues of NASA authorization and Superfund. Concurrently, after 1995, the numbers 
of "laboratory," "industry" and "other" witnesses decreased substantially. 
The data also show that the loss of the OTA did not necessarily mean of loss of 
objective sources of information. In the case of NASA, the OTA had a significant 
presence, but was replaced with the NRC, NCGIA, and PIPS upon its demise in 1995. 
The OTA also carried substantial weight on the issue of Superfund, and upon the 
congressional takeover in 1995 the GAO appears to step up to take the place of the OTA. 
The OTA did not have the same presence on the issue of global warming, but the data 
reflect an overall decrease in the number of research witnesses after 1995. Not only did 
the OTA disappear, but its contempor,aries in the research category also disappeared. 
39 http: uww.nci .ur~  inde~.aso?carnum=2&caficI=136 
" hltp: uww.asme.urr ahuut Vijiun Missiun Cure Values.cfm 
Finally, within the category of government witnesses we see a parallel to the 
 
overall politicization trends within each case study. Both NASA and Superfund show a 
decrease in the number of political representatives, while global warming shows an 
increase in the number of representatives and senators who are present in congressional 
hearings. In the interest group category, we see an overall increase in politicization, 
across all three issues. The witnesses that Congress called after 1995 tended to be grass- 
roots organizations, which were more conservatively-minded and principle-driven than 
those called before 1995. This trend would support Mooney's claim that there has been 
an overall increase in the politicization of science, following the 1995 GOP takeover of 
Congress. 
CHAPTER IV: CONCLUSIONS 
 This study began with a fundamental question involving the politicization of the 
scientific information received by Congress. Through the lens of my three case studies, I 
examined this question systematically in order to test my three hypotheses: 
The politicization hypothesis: more witnesses that represent organizations with a 
bias would testify to the House Committee on Science after the decline of the 
OTA. 
The substitution hypothesis: the objective information provided by OTA would 
not be substituted for by some other government research organization, like OTA. 
The party hypothesis: witnesses testifying after the OTA's demise would have a 
Republican bias. 
In keeping with the expectations of scholars who study the role of parties in 
Congress, I remained open to the possibility that politicization may vary across issues. In 
two of the three cases, the findings show no evidence of politicization in the sources of 
information, and even some evidence of less politicization after OTA. In the third case, 
the sources became increasingly politicized. From these results, we can deduce that the 
degree of politicization depends on the issue being considered. Some issues, like global 
warming, are more divisive along party lines than others. Thus, the first hypothesis is 
only valid in one of the three cases. 
The substitution effect also varies by issue. In the first case, the OTA sources of 
information were replaced with information from the NRC, PIPS, and NCGIA; in the 
second case, the OTA was partially replaced by the GAO; and in the third case, the OTA 
did not play a central role prior to 1995, but upon its demise, all sources of "research 
, 
witness disappeared. One possibility is that the more specialized the policy issue is, the 
less likely one is to see substitution effects. 
Finally, within the interest groups category, we see an increase in the GOP bias of 
the individual witness groups called to testify. Interestingly, in all three cases, the 
interest group witnesses reflect an ideological shift favoring conservatives after the 1995 
GOP takeover. If I were to delve into the acadimic and industry categories as well, I 
would expect to see a similar trend: greater focus on grassroots, conservative principles, 
and a deviation from professional, politically neutral organizations or groups. This 
hypothesis seems to hold up across issues, and may reflect the general drift toward 
partisanship on the Hill. The majority party rules the House and this bias is evident even 
on the least partisan issue. One wonders if any other issues escape the partisan bias noted 
in these data. Yet, it is worth noting that OTA's fall was not necessarily a cause of the 
rise in GOP leaning witnesses; with or without the OTA, the GOP would have invited 
their allies; just as the Democrats had before them, 
In returning to my initial hypothesis, I can make three statements as a result of my 
analysis. 
First, the politicization of the congressional sources of information depends on the 
nature of the hearing topic. In the case of NASA and Superfund the types of 
witnesses present do not seem to reflect an increased politicization. However, the 
case of global warming, which is politically charged, reflects an increase in 
politicization. Further, there is a decrease in the overall number of witnesses 
which are called, indicating that Congress is not only calling its own witnesses, 
but is also turning a silent ear to witness testimony. 
Second, the OTA had a range of influence on congressional hearings. In some 
cases, it was heavily replied upon; in other cases, it was merely a contributing 
source. As a result, its demise had differing effects on the politicization of 
congressional information. It would be misleading to link the overall 
politicization of scientific information to the demise of the OTA. My results are 
inconclusive: two cases show a replacement source of information filling OTA's 
role, and the third reflects a non-influential OTA prior to 1995 and the 
disappearance of all research-based witnesses after 1995. 
. Third, while the politicization of scientific information cannot be conclusively 
linked to the demise of the OTA, it is fair to say that the sources of scientific 
information reflect a conservative leaning, following the 1995 GOP takeover. 
The interest group witnesses in particular reflect an increased influence of the 
Republican Party. Mooney appears to be correct in his analysis that there has 
been a change in the types of scientific information on which congress relies. 
In sum, the results are mixed: the degree of politicization largely depends on the issues at 
hand. 
Caveats 
A few caveats are worth noting to put the main findings into perspective. First 
and foremost, while the primary focus of my study is to look at the effects of the OTA 
and the sources of information on which Congress relies, we cannot neglect to 
acknowledge that the change or lack thereof that we find in sources of scientific 
information might not be due to the demise of the OTA, but rather, due to a bias inherent 
in the new Congress. This possibility is particularly relevant to the third hypothesis. 
While the OTA was present, both the Republicans and the Democrats had a common 
resource which would provide equally unbiased information to both, neither confirming 
nor denying the partisan claims of either. Specifically, the OTA sought to remain above 
making policy recommendations, thus keeping itself from falling into the trap of 
partisanship. One would expect that upon its demise, it would be possible to link an 
increase in political bias in the sources of scientific information to the absence of the 
OTA. However, it is possible that the change in sources of information (or lack thereof) 
could be caused by the change in congressional leadership, and might not be reflective of 
the absence of the OTA. While this leadership change creates our "window of 
opportunity" it could also be the direct cause of the changes that we see after 1995. 
Second, in the original design of the study, I assumed I that organizational 
affiliation correlated with the type of testimony that a witness would provide. I also 
assumed that a research based witness would provide more scientifically accurate and 
unbiased information than would an interest group or an industry witness. This 
assumption is based on logical principles, and corroborated by both Mooney and Bimber. 
However, the assumption is not expressly tested in this case study and thesis. Moreover, 
I do not take into consideration the individual political affiliations of academic witnesses 
or the particular testimonies of research witnesses. In so far as my study tests Bimber's 
conclusions using the same research characteristics, it is accurate and generally 
applicable. Further analysis should justify the assumptions which are made and clarify 
all remaining witness affiliations. 
Finally, since the study is focused on one committee, the patterns found here 
should be subjected to further analysis before we generalize about the effect of OTA's 
demise. Though I have no reason to doubt that the political intent of hearings in other 
committees also varies by issue, future research should also take into account the 
scientific witnesses presented before committees that do not have the express jurisdiction 
over issues of scientific merit. Mooney would suggest that the primary politicization of 
science occurs precisely in committees that do not have the jurisdiction or the authority to 
consider issues of scientific merit. While the wide majority of science based hearings 
appear before the Science Committee, politicization is not arbitrarily confined to one 
particular committee. This assumption should also be tested, by expanding my research 
scope beyond merely this particular committee. An expansion of this nature would lend 
itself to conclusions which are more widely applicable to the entirety of congressional 
committee hearings on science issues. Future steps for this analysis include consideration 
of committees other than the House Committee on Science, as well as analysis of direct 
witness testimony and a complete witness affiliation database. 
Concluding Remarks 
Jon M. Peha, Professor of Electrical Engineering and Public Policy at Camegie Mellon 
University stated on July 25, 2006, 
"This year, almost every committee in Congress will face one or more 
issues that are similarly hard to disentangle without expertise in some area 
of science or technology. This includes issues related to energy, the 
environment, health care, food safety, national defense, homeland 
security, space exploration, intellectual property, transportation, and 
telecommunications, just to name a few (Peha, 2006, I)." 
Peha (2006, 1) goes on to discuss the characteristics of an effective science advisory 
organization, stating that it must be "responsive, credible, impartial, and independent." 
Without a doubt, the OTA served as this source of information to Congress. In its 
absence, Congress members must find a replacement for OTA or go without the 
objective, balanced information provided by the OTA. Peha states, 
"In short, there is a fundamental gap in the information available to 
Congress. There is no consistent source of in-depth assessments that are 
balanced, complete, impartial, and produced at a time and in a format that 
is sensitive to the specific needs of Congress [9]. CRS reports are sensitive 
to Congressional needs and are designed to be impartial, but, by design, 
are limited in scope and depth. Partisan input also can be sensitive to the 
needs of Congress, hut it is never impartial. Other information produced 
outside of Congress tends to he far less sensitive to Congressional needs, 
and the majority of it advocates for particular positions rather than merely 
providing a baseline assessment (6)." 
The results of my analysis of the second hypothesis demonstrate in the case of 
NASA that Congress felt the need for such a research agency, replacing the OTA with 
PIPS and the NCGIA. The hearings on Superfund appear partially to replace the OTA 
with the GAO. In the case of global warming, the 1995 GOP takeover resulted in the 
shortage of all research witnesses. Whether this gap was directly linked to the absence of 
the OTA, or whether it was an indirect consequence of the administrative change, the 
conclusion is still the same: Congress felt a significant absence of a particular type of 
responsive, credible, impartial, and independent information. The results of the third 
hypothesis c o n f m  this conclusion: in the absence of the OTA, the issues which were 
politically tenuous saw a striking lack of non-politicized testimony. Though we should 
be glad that politicization is not rampant across all issues, politicization of science for any 
issue is no less worrisome than if it extended across the broad range of issues. 
APPENDIX A: Acronyms 
AAAS: American Association for the Advancement of Science 
AAES: American Association of Engineering Societies 
ACEEE: American Council for an Energy-Efficient Economy 
AF: Air Force 
AFL-CIO: American Federation of Labor-Congress of Industrial Organizations 
AGU: American Geological Union 
AIAA: American Institute of Aeronautics and Astronautics 
AISSO: AeroAsti-o and International Small Satellite Organization 
AL: American Legion 
ANEC: American Nuclear Energy Council 
API: American Petroleum Institute 
ASA: Aerospace States Association 
ASEB: American Societies for Experimental Biology 
ASGSB: American Society for Gravitational and Space Biology 
ASI: Analytic Services Inc 
ASME: American Society of Mechanical Engineers 
ATSDR: Agency for Toxic Substances and Disease Registry 
AV: AeroVironment 
BA: K W Brown and Assocs 
BCSE: Business Council for Sustainable Energy 
BT: Banker's Trust 
CACNSP: Citizens' Advisory Council on National Space Policy 
CAN: Concerned Neighbors in Action 
CBO: Congressional Budget Office 
CCHW: Citizen's Clearinghouse for Hazardous Wastes 
CDC: Center for Disease Control 
CE: Coalition for the Environment 
CEI: Competitive Enterprise Institute 
CEQ: Council on Environmental Quality 
CERCLA: Comprehensive Environmental Response, Compensation and Liability 
CRA: Charles River Associates 
CRS: Congressional Research Service 
CSRC: Contarmnated Sites Resident Committee 
CURC: Coal Utilization Research Council 
DARPA: Defense Advanced Research Projects Agency 
DOC: Department of Commerce 
DOD: Department of Defense 
DOE: Department of Energy 
DOS: Department of State 
DOT: Department of Transportation 
EDF: Environmental Defense Fund 
EHPA: Environmental Health Protection Agent 
EIA: Energy Information Adrmmstration 
EPA: Environmental Protection Agency 
Act 
EPRI: Electric Power Research Institute 
FAA: Federal Aviation Administration 
FAS: Federation of American Scientists 
GAO: Government Accountability Office 
GARP: Global Atmospheric Research Program 
GCC: Council for Global Climate Change 
GOP: Grand Old Party (Republican Party) 
GRJ: Gas Research Institute 
GS: Geological Survey 
GZA. Goldberg-Zoino and Assocs 
HA: Hirschhom and Associates 
HRS: Hazardous Ranking System 
HSRC: Northeast Hazardous Substance Research Center 
HWTC: Hazardous Waste Treatment Council 
IEEE: Institute of Electrical and Electronics Engineers 
P A :  Independent Petroleum Association 
PCC: Intergovernmental Panel on Climate Change 
IRG: International Resources Group, Ltd 
ISCD: Internal Security and Commerce Division 
IWS: Ill Water Survey 
L5S: L5 Society 
MPAG: Madison Public Affairs Group 
NAS: National Academy of the Sciences 
NASA: National Aeronautics and Space Administration 
NASUCA: National Association of State Utllity Consumer Advocates 
NCAR: National Center for Atmospheric Research 
NCATH: National Campaign Against Toxic Hazards and Clean Water Action Project 
NCGIA: National Center for Geographical Information and Analysis 
NCP: National Contingency Plan 
NEI: Nuclear Energy Institute 
NHA: National Hydrogen Association 
NHPA: New Hampshire People's Alliance 
NIEHS: National Institute of Environmental Health Sciences 
NIH: National Institutes of Health 
NMA: National Mining Association 
NOAA: National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration. 
NPL: National Priorities List 
NRC: National Research Council 
NRDC: National Resources Defense Council 
NRDC: Natural Resources Defense Council 
NSF: National Science Foundation 
NSS: National Space Society 
OAST: Office of Aeronautics and Space Technology 
OBM: Office of Budget Management 
OCST: Office of Commercial Space Transportation 
OEETD: Office of Environmental Engineering and Technology Demonstration 
OERR: Office of Emergency and Remedial Response 
ORD: Office of Research and Development 
OSRMQA: Office of Safety, Reliability, Maintainability and Quality Assurance 
OSTP: Office of Science and Technology Policy 
OTA: Office of Technology Assessment 
PFUT: Project Finance, Utilities and Telecommunications Group 
PIPS: Potomac Institute for Policy Studies 
PS: Planetary Society 
R&D: Research and Development 
RAGS: Rising Above the Gathering Storm 
Reach: Reach for the Stars '89 
RF: Resources for the Future 
RMI: Rocky Mountain Institute 
RRS: RUST Remedial Service 
S&T: Science and Technology 
SERI: Solar Energy Research Institute 
SFF: Space Frontier Foundation 
SIO: Scripps Institution of Oceanography 
SLH: Shearson Lehman Hutton 
SRS: Scientific Research Society 
SSTC: Space Systems Technical Committee 
TAB: Technology Assessment Board 
UMWA: United Mine Workers Association 
USA: United Space Alliance 
USPIR: US Public Interest Research Group 
USSR: Union of Soviet Socialist Republics 
WHRC: Woods Hole Research Center 
WMO: World Meteorological Organization 
WRI: World Resources Institute 
APPENDIX B: GOVERNMENT AND INTEREST GROUP WITNESS TRENDS 
NASA WITNESS TRENDS: GOVERNMENT AND INTEREST GROUPS 
Government I BEFORE I AFTER I 
DOT 
AF 
NASA 125 35 
NIH 
I I 1 
OSRMQA 
DARPA 0 1 1 
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